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OWNERSHIP WITHOUT CITIZENSHIP:
THE CREATION OF NONCITIZEN
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Allison Brownell Tirres*
At the nation’s founding, the common law of property defined ownership as an
incident of citizenship. Noncitizens were unable lawfully to hold, devise, or inherit
property. This doctrine eroded during the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, but few scholars have examined its demise or the concommittant rise of
property rights for foreigners. This Article is the first sustained treatment of the
creation of property rights for noncitizens in American law. It uncovers two key
sources for the rights that emerged during the nineteenth century: federal territorial
law, which allowed for alien property ownership and alien suffrage, and state con-
stitutions, a significant number of which included property rights for noncitizens.
Iowa, Wisconsin, California, and Michigan led the way, including these rights in
their state constitutions prior to the Civil War. Through close examination of
congressional debates, records of state constitutional conventions, and other histori-
cal texts, this Article places this significant legal reform in a broader historical
context. Lawmakers succeded in untethering notions of citizenship from notions of
ownership, creating a more expansive vision of membership in the American polity.
Property law was itself a form of immigration law, used not to expel migrants but
rather to attract them and eventually, lawmakers hoped, to assimilate them as new
Americans. The property reforms discussed here did not, however, result in prop-
erty rights for all noncitizens; in fact, a majority of states today have some form of
property restriction based on alienage. This Article suggests that an answer for the
persistance of noncitizen property restrictions in American law lies in the nine-
teenth century. Reform efforts in this era held the seeds of restrictive policies that
would develop later in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, such as anti-Asian
land laws and anti-illegal immigrant housing ordinances. Sources from the
ninteenth century reveal that becoming “American” through property ownership
was not a fully inclusive process; from the outset it was limited by assumptions
about national origin, race and territorial location.
* Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. B.A., Princeton
University; J.D., Harvard Law School; Ph.D., Harvard University. For helpful suggestions, I
would like to thank Joanna Grisinger, Richard Helmholz, Max Helveston, Aziz Huq, David
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INTRODUCTION
Property law is one of several important areas of law subject to state
jurisdiction that can directly influence the lives of noncitizens.1 Despite
recent court decisions upholding federal preemption of state immigration
enforcement efforts,2 states retain significant influence over the member-
ship rights of noncitizens.3 States and municipalities today can limit nonci-
tizens’ access to public benefits, public institutions of higher education, and
1. For recent scholarship on the intersection of property law and immigration, see Elea-
nor Marie Lawrence Brown, Visa as Property, Visa as Collateral, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1047 (2011);
Kristina M. Campbell, Local Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinances: A Legal, Policy, and Litigation
Analysis, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 1041, 1051–54 (2007); Daniel Eduardo Guzma´n, “There Be No
Shelter Here”: Anti-Immigrant Housing Ordinances and Comprehensive Reform, 20 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 399 (2010); Rigel C. Oliveri, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Landlords, Latinos,
Anti-Illegal Immigrant Ordinances, and Housing Immigration, 62 VAND. L. REV. 53 (2009); Ayelet
Shachar, Earned Citizenship: Property Lessons for Immigration Reform, 23 YALE J.L & HUMAN. 110
(2011); Allison Brownell Tirres, Property Outliers: Non-Citizens, Property Rights and State Power,
27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 77 (2012); Rose Cuison Villazor, Rediscovering Oyama v. California: At
the Intersection of Property, Race, and Citizenship, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 979 (2010).
2. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (striking down portions of Ari-
zona’s omnibus immigration law).
3. On the contours of state power, see Huyen Pham, The Private Enforcement of Immigra-
tion Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 777 (2008); Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immi-
gration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008); Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration
Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627 (1997); Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State
and Local Power over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1559 (2008).
FALL 2013] Ownership Without Citizenship 3
forms of identification like driver’s licenses.4 Some states also limit immi-
grants’ access to employment through state licensing laws.5 Traditionally,
states have also determined the scope of noncitizens’ rights to own and
lease real estate; at least thirty-six states currently limit property rights in
some fashion based on alienage status—that is, on whether a person is a
citizen or an alien.6
Most recent scholarship—and much recent litigation—has focused
on the ways that states and municipalities have used such regulatory powers
to limit or restrict the rights of noncitizens, particularly those who are in
the country without authorization.7 This preoccupation with restriction is
present in immigration history, as well: most accounts of state and federal
immigration law focus on the ways that lawmakers have limited migration
and excluded certain migrants.8 This Article takes up the issue of federal
and state power over noncitizens from a different vantage point: that of
governmental expansion of noncitizens’ rights. The expansion of rights is
rarely discussed in conversations about contemporary immigration law or
in the press, and it is rarely challenged in the courts.9 Nevertheless, with
4. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP:
PROCESS AND POLICY 1354–406 (6th ed. 2008) (describing the various state regulations of im-
migrant membership); Kim Severson, North Carolina to Give Some Immigrants Driver’s Licenses,
with a Pink Stripe, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/06/us/
north-carolina-to-give-some-immigrants-drivers-licenses-with-a-pink-stripe.html?_r=0 (chart-
ing the variation in state policies regarding immigrant driver’s licenses).
5. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011) (upholding an
Arizona law that revokes the licenses of businesses found to be employing unauthorized
workers).
6. See Tirres supra note 1, at Part II.B.
7. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012); Hiroshi Motomura, Feder-
alism, International Human Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361,
1365 (1999); Huyen Pham, The Private Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 777 (2008);
Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1640–42
(1997); Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over Immigration, 86
N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1559 (2008) (“[T]here is a veritable deluge of state and local legislation
seeking to regulate non-citizens.”); Immigration Enforcement-Related Litigation, NATIONAL IMMI-
GRATION LAW CENTER, http://www.nilc.org/litigationie.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2013); State
and Local Law Enforcement, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL LEGAL ACTION CENTER, http:/
/www.legalactioncenter.org/clearinghouse/litigation-issue-pages/state-and-local-law-enforce-
ment (last visited Oct. 13, 2013).
8. Kerry Abrams, The Hidden Dimension of Nineteenth-Century Immigration Law, 62 VAND.
L. REV. 1353, 1354 (2009) (“Most histories of immigration law are histories of restriction.”).
9. But see, e.g., PHILIP KRETSEDEMAS, THE IMMIGRATION CRUCIBLE: TRANSFORMING
RACE, NATION, AND THE LIMITS OF THE LAW 75 (2012) (“[L]ocal immigration laws should
not simply be viewed as a strategy that is being used to ‘keep immigrants out’ but as one feature
within a broad array of recruitment mechanisms, policies, and social dynamics that are being
used to coercively integrate some immigrant populations into U.S. society.”); Cristina M. Rod-
riguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 582–89 (2008)
(discussing the important role that state and local governments play in integrating lawful immi-
grants); Rose Cuison Villazor, “Sanctuary Cities” and Local Citizenship, 37 FORDHAM URB. L. J.
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comprehensive immigration reform still on the drawing board, state legis-
lators and local officials are taking matters into their own hands, and some
are doing so in a way that expands noncitizens’ rights.10 To fully under-
stand the contours of both federal and state power vis-a`-vis immigrants, we
must attend to how and why lawmakers have expanded noncitizens’ rights,
not just how and why they have restricted them.
This Article demonstrates that both the federal government and the
states employed property law as a tool of immigration regulation in the
nineteenth century: not just to expel migrants, but also to attract them. It
is the first scholarly treatment of this key moment in the expansion of
noncitizens’ rights in American history.11 In the mid-nineteenth century,
a significant number of state governments adopted provisions in their state
constitutions guaranteeing the property rights of noncitizens.12 In order to
do so, state actors had to overcome a long common law tradition of re-
stricting property ownership by citizenship status. Throughout the nine-
teenth century, courts in most states adhered to the English common law
doctrine that prohibited ownership or alienation by noncitizens.13 These
restrictions were commonly referred to as alien property disabilities or
alien land laws.14 State constitutional provisions dramatically altered this
common law scheme. Iowa was first: its 1844 constitution stated that
“[f]oreigners who are, or who may hereafter become residents of this
573 (2010) (describing the creation of “sanctuary ordinances” for the inclusion and protection of
undocumented migrants).
10. For example, Los Angeles recently joined a number of other municipalities that offer a
municipal identification card to all residents, whether citizen or noncitizen, and whether legal or
illegal. See Ian Lovett, IDs for Illegal Immigrants Take a Step in Los Angeles, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16,
2012, at A23; Kathleen Miles, ID Cards for Undocumented Immigrants in L.A. Approved by Council,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/09/id-cards-
undocumented-immigrants-la_n_2102504.html. For a general discussion of state expansion of
benefits, see Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57,
59–65 (2007).
11. Historians and legal scholars have spent little time exploring the history of state con-
stitutional provisions relating to noncitizen property or to state constitution drafting in general in
the nineteenth century. Christian Fritz, More than “Shreds and Patches”: California’s First Bill of
Rights, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 13, 14 (1989) [hereinafter Fritz, California’s First Bill of
Rights] (“There has been a remarkable dearth of scholarly writing on nineteenth century consti-
tution-making.”). Those who have attended to state constitutional property law have focused
primarily on economic and regulatory issues like the history of eminent domain or civil rights
issues like public accommodations law. See, e.g., JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY
OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (3d ed. 2008). Those
who have discussed these specific noncitizen provisions have done so only in passing. Some have
linked them to federal constitutional reforms, such as the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment,
but they have not demonstrated any causal connections. See Charles H. Sullivan, Alien Land
Laws: A Re-Evaluation, 36 TEMP. L.Q. 15, 28–29 (1962).
12. See infra Part II.C.
13. See Polly J. Price, Alien Land Restrictions in the American Common Law: Exploring the
Relative Autonomy Paradigm, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 152, 157 (1999).
14. See id.
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State, shall enjoy the same rights in respect to the possession, enjoyment,
and inheritance of property, as native born citizens.”15 Wisconsin, Califor-
nia, and Michigan followed suit with almost identical language in their
antebellum constitutions.16 Seven more states followed after the Civil War:
Florida, West Virginia, Arkansas, Alabama, Colorado, South Dakota, and
Wyoming.17 In this Article, I trace the histories of the four first adopters—
Iowa, Wisconsin, California, and Michigan—in order to understand both
the causes and the consequences of constitutionalizing property rights for
noncitizens.
One of the most significant influences on state constitutional reform
was federal territorial law. States’ expansion of noncitizens’ property rights
was directly facilitated by federal law. In choosing how to sell public lands
and how to create a blueprint for the governance of the western territo-
ries, Congress decided to expand the rights of foreigners. The Land Ordi-
nances of 1784 and 1785 jettisoned common law restrictions on alien
property ownership; the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 allowed for alien
suffrage.18 These federal policies fostered the development of a land-own-
ing immigrant electorate.19 In all four of the states that adopted these
rights in the antebellum period, residents of foreign birth were active par-
ticipants in state constitutional conventions.20 When it came time for re-
sidents of Iowa and other states in the West to draft their state
constitutions, they had already experienced years of expanded rights for
noncitizens.
15. IOWA CONST. OF 1844, art. II, § 21 (1846). This proposed constitution failed ratifica-
tion, twice, by the populace. See BENJAMIN SHAMBAUGH, THE HISTORY OF THE IOWA CON-
STITUTIONS 271, 279 (1902). The same clause was included in the constitution of 1846, which
was ratified. Id. at 324; see also IOWA CONST. OF 1846, art. II, § 22; JACK STARK, THE IOWA
CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE (1998).
16. WIS. CONST. art I, § 15 (“No distinction shall ever be made by law between resident
aliens and citizens, in reference to the possession, enjoyment or descent of property.”); CAL.
CONST. art. 1, § 17 (“Foreigners who are, or who may hereafter become bona fide residents of
this State, shall enjoy the same rights in respect to the possession, enjoyment, and inheritance of
property, as native born citizens.”); MICH. CONST. art. 18, § 6 (“Aliens who are residents of this
state shall enjoy the same rights and privileges in property as citizens of this state.”).
17. FLA. CONST. OF 1868, art. I, § 2; W. VA. CONST. OF 1872, art. II, § 5; ARK. CONST.
OF 1874, art. II, § 20; ALA. CONST. OF 1875, art I, § 34; COL. CONST. OF 1876, art. II, § 27;
S.D. CONST. OF 1889, art. VI, § 14; WYO. CONST. OF 1890, art. I, § 29. Three states—Penn-
sylvania, North Carolina, and Vermont—had alien property rights provisions in their eight-
eenth-century constitutions. All three had repealed this language by the time Iowa introduced its
provision. See discussion infra part II.A.
18. See infra Part II.C.
19. Other scholars have noted the significant ways federal law shaped state and local polit-
ics. See, e.g., Peter S. Onuf, The Expanding Union, in DEVISING LIBERTY: PRESERVING AND
CREATING FREEDOM IN THE NEW AMERICAN REPUBLIC 75 (David Thomas Konig ed., 1995).
However, few have discussed the ways that federal influence shaped the place of immigrants in
politics in the territories.
20. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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This investigation of nineteenth-century state constitutional reform
builds on recent work that explores the expansive dimension of immigra-
tion regulation, and it adds an important—and largely missing—property
law perspective.21 Property ownership had been understood in the English
feudal and aristocratic tradition as a privilege belonging to few, not a right
belonging to many. But this idea eroded in the fledgling United States, and
was put under especially heavy attack in the 1830s and 1840s. Jacksonian
democracy22 and the ideology of “free soil”23 demanded the extension of
property rights to White men and, in some cases, to White married
women. State and federal lawmakers applied these same principles to
noncitizens’ access to property.24 In doing so, they eroded the traditional
21. See Kerry Abrams, The Hidden Dimension of Nineteenth-Century Immigration Law, 62
VAND. L. REV. 1353, 1403 (2009) (citing, but not focusing on, the federal government’s “strate-
gic use of property law through homestead acts” in the nineteenth century); see generally
HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2006); ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN:
IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE FASHIONING OF AMERICA (2006); Richard H. Chused, The Ore-
gon Donation Act of 1850 and Nineteenth Century Federal Married Women’s Property Law, 2 LAW &
HIST. REV. 44–78 (1984); James E. Pfander & Theresa R. Wardon, Reclaiming the Immigration
Constitution of the Early Republic: Prospectivity, Uniformity and Transparency, 96 VA. L. REV. 359,
376 (2010); Aziz Rana, Settler Empire and the Promise of American Freedom (2007) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with Harvard University library).
22. Jacksonian democracy is the term commonly used to refer to the political movement
in the nineteenth century centered around politician and President Andrew Jackson. Among the
issues Jacksonians supported were universal suffrage for White men and territorial expansion.
See, e.g., SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN
312–89 (2006).
23. Proponents of the ideology of free soil promoted independent small farmers and arti-
sans and opposed slavery and wage labor. See generally CHARLES W. MCCURDY, THE ANTI-
RENT ERA IN NEW YORK LAW AND POLITICS, 1839–1865 (Thomas A. Green & Hendrick
Hartog eds., 2001); ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (1970).
24. The nineteenth century witnessed other property law revolutions, particularly with
regard to poor White males, married women and former slaves. For example, the century wit-
nessed the end of property qualifications for voting, allowing broader suffrage for White men.
See, e.g., ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DE-
MOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 2, 24 (rev. ed. 2009) (“adult white males who did not own
land” were among those excluded from suffrage at the Founding); BARBARA YOUNG WELKE,
LAW AND THE BORDERS OF BELONGING IN THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED
STATES (2010). During Reconstruction, legislators understood that freed slaves would not be
accepted as members of the polity without access to property, and they passed the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 in response. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION, 1863–1877 (1988). Married Women’s Property Acts represented efforts of legis-
lators to protect the financial health of families, but they also altered the relationship of women
to the state, speeding the erosion of coverture and the eventual granting of suffrage. See GREG-
ORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776–1970, at 158–84 (1997) [hereinafter ALEXANDER, COM-
MODITY AND PROPRIETY] ; NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE,
AND PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK (1982); Nancy F. Cott, Marriage and
Women’s Citizenship in the United States, 1830–1934, 103 AM. HIST. REV. 1440 (1998). Property
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common law division between citizens and aliens. It was no longer neces-
sary in these states to be a citizen in order to be an owner.
These constitutional protections only went so far. They effectively
ended the power of property to differentiate citizen from noncitizen, but
they perpetuated a core distinction between resident and nonresident
aliens. This careful line-drawing managed to rid the state of the most ob-
jectionable parts of alien land laws, which discriminated against upstanding
members of the community (desirable settlers and laborers), while retain-
ing the most politically appealing parts (those aimed at preventing foreign
takeover and “absentee landlordism”).
Line-drawing would take a new form in the twentieth century, as
states redrafted their land laws to discriminate against those “ineligible to
naturaliz[e]”25 (namely Asian migrants) and those who had roots in com-
munist countries.26 A full treatment of twentieth-century developments is
beyond the scope of this Article, but I believe we can see the seeds of
subsequent exclusionary actions within these nineteenth-century constitu-
tional provisions. For example, noncitizens’ property rights were linked in
statehood debates with citizens’ desire to divest American Indians of their
property claims and to provide a buffer against the in-migration of free
Blacks.27 Race played a leading role in determining which migrants would
receive which rights, regardless of their citizenship status. This Article
demonstrates that the expansion of noncitizen rights depended upon the
restriction of some citizens’ rights; inclusion had a corresponding aspect of
exclusion.28
A key finding of this Article is that governments regulate migration
not just through traditional “immigration law,” which governs entrance
into and exit from a jurisdiction, but also through “alienage law,” which
structured the relationship of these initially nominal members of the polity—poor White males,
freed slaves, and women—to full, participatory citizenship. This Article is one of the first to
demonstrate the reach of property reform to noncitizens.
25. Chinese Exclusion Act, § 14, 22 Stat. (May 6, 1882) (barring Chinese from naturali-
zation); Immigration Act of 1917 (extending naturalization bar to all Asian immigrants). The
Naturalization Act of 1870 limited naturalization to “free white persons and persons of African
nativity, or African descent.” For discussion of these naturalization provisions, see IAN HANEY
LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW 30–34 (1996).
26. See Tirres, supra note 1, at 94–97.
27. On the migration of free Blacks and freed slaves, see EUGENE H. BERWANGER, THE
FRONTIER AGAINST SLAVERY (2002); Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigra-
tion Law (1776–1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993); Kunal Parker, Making Blacks Foreigners:
The Legal Construction of Former Slaves in Post-Revolutionary Massachusetts, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 75
(2001).
28. On “inclusive exclusion,” see Devon W. Carbado, Racial Naturalization, in LEGAL
BORDERLANDS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN BORDERS 41 (Mary Dudziak &
Leti Volpp eds., 2006); see also EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREE-
DOM, at x (2003) (noting the dependent relationship of slavery to liberty).
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dictates migrants’ rights while they are within the jurisdiction.29 Regula-
tion of migrants’ rights is more often than not a means of regulating mi-
gration itself. This observation undermines the traditional distinction made
between “immigration” and “civil rights” law. When it comes to the reg-
ulation of noncitizens in the United States, the two are inevitably linked.30
Part I of this Article describes the federal treatment of alien property.
I argue that the ordinances governing the Northwest Territory, as well as
subsequent laws and treaties pertaining to the rest of the West, created a
federal policy of alien land rights. This federal policy was an important
precondition for the creation of alien property rights in the states in the
1840s.
Part II explores the influence of this federal policy on state govern-
ments. It describes the process of transitioning from territory to state and
emphasizes the important step of drafting a state constitution. It delves into
the debates in the four states that first adopted noncitizen property
rights—Iowa, Wisconsin, California, and Michigan—and describes the
major themes that emerged. The debates reveal multiple motivations for
the legal change that transpired: the desires to protect vested property in-
terests, encourage future migration, promote property law reform, and as-
similate immigrants. Importantly, delegates’ decision to constitutionalize
noncitizen rights was founded upon a particularly “American” vision of
property law: one that was modern, open, and inclusive. This system of
property, they asserted, would “Americanize” immigrants by showing
them what independence really meant.31
29. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, Federalism and Proposition 187,
35 VA. J. INT’L L. 201, 202–03 (1994) (“As traditionally understood, ‘immigration law’ [refers
to] the admission and expulsion of aliens, and ‘alienage law’ embraces other matters relating to
their legal status.”).
30. See id. at 203 (noting that “alienage” rules may effectively function as “immigration”
rules, and vice versa); see also Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U.
PENN. L. REV. 341, 343 (2008) (arguing that the traditional distinction between laws that regu-
late migration and laws that regulate migrant rights is “misguided,” since “every rule that im-
poses duties on noncitizens imposes both selection pressure, potentially influencing noncitizens’
decisions about whether to enter or depart the United States, and regulatory pressure, potentially
influencing the way in which resident noncitizens live.”); Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Immigration
Law? Citizens, Aliens, and the Constitution 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1567, 1598–99 (1997) (reviewing
GERALD NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION (1996)). This episode of state constitu-
tion-making also usefully highlights lesser-known sources for the constitutional protection of
aliens. We usually view the turning point in the constitutional protection of noncitizens as the
famous case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, which extended Fourteenth Amendment protections to
Chinese immigrants, despite the fact that they were not, and could not at that time become,
naturalized citizens. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). What these state constitutional provisions reveal is
widespread acceptance, at a moment decades before Yick Wo, of fundamental rights for certain
noncitizens.
31. See, e.g., JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION TO FORM A CONSTITUTION FOR THE
STATE OF WISCONSIN, 1847, at 93 (Madison, Wis., W.T., Tenney, Smith & Holt 1848) [here-
inafter WIS. CONVENTION OF 1847] (comments of Mr. Sanders).
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Constitutionalizing alien property rights was a significant step, since
most states still adhered to the common law doctrine that limited property
ownership to citizens only. Yet, as this Article explains, it was also a com-
plicated and limited step: lawmakers expanded rights for aliens at the ex-
pense of others. Part III contextualizes the state constitutional debates by
examining concurrent debates over the migration of free Blacks, the grant-
ing of universal suffrage, and the fear of foreign corporate invasion. The
choice to expand noncitizen rights was, on its face, an inclusive one. Yet it
depended, both rhetorically and politically, on a deliberate exclusion of
non-White landowners and non-resident foreigners. This exclusion helps
to explain the continued prevalence of restrictive alien land laws in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, despite these state constitutional
advances:
Finally, Part IV discusses the persistence of the link between citizen-
ship and property ownership in American law. It suggests that continued
restriction is due in part to an ongoing ambivalence about the place of
noncitizens in the American polity. The inclusion of noncitizen property
rights in state constitutions is one chapter in a long and as yet unfinished
story about the contested relationship between citizenship and
ownership.32
I. NONCITIZEN PROPERTY AND FEDERAL POLICY
Following the American Revolution, alien property rights were un-
derstood to be a matter of common law and thus subject to state jurisdic-
tion.33 In 1790, Congress discussed extending property rights to aliens as
32. The long, complicated history of alien property ownership is largely reduced in the
historical and legal literature to a focus on the infamous anti-Asian alien land laws of the early
twentieth century, which prevented noncitizens of Asian heritage from owning or leasing farm-
land. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, No Right to Own: The Early Twentieth-Century Alien Land Laws as a
Prelude to Internment, 40 B.C. L. REV. 37 (1998); Dudley O. McGovney, The Anti-Japanese Land
Laws of California and Ten Other States, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 33 (1947); Charles H. Sullivan, Alien
Land Laws: A Re-Evaluation, 36 TEMP. L. Q. 15, 28 (1962). While the anti-Asian land laws are of
great importance, they are one chapter in a much longer story. For recent work discussing the
relationship of alienage and property in American history, see, e.g., Price, supra note 13; Karen
M. Tani, Flemming v. Nestor: Anticommunism, the Welfare State, and the Making of New Property,
26 LAW & HIST. REV. 389 (2008).
33. See, e.g., The Notes of William Patterson, in 4 THE DIARY OF WILLIAM MACLAY
AND OTHER NOTES ON THE SENATE DEBATES 494 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds.,
1988) [hereinafter The Notes of William Patterson] (noting sentiments expressed during the
congressional debates over the first naturalization law that “tenure and protection of property
belong to each state” and “the right of holding property belongs to the State”); The Diary of
William MacClay, in 4 THE DIARY OF WILLIAM MACLAY AND OTHER NOTES ON THE SENATE
DEBATES 221 [hereinafter The Diary of William Maclay] (“It therefore strictly speaking rested,
with the respective States whether they would repeal the common law with respect to Aliens.”);
2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 70 (New York, Banks & Brothers 1832)
(characterizing rights of property ownership as “civil privileges, conferred upon aliens, by state
authority”).
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part of the first naturalization law. These proposals failed, not because rep-
resentatives were hostile to the idea of alien ownership, but because they
believed it was the province of the states, not the federal government, to
decide to extend such property rights. But deference to the states did not
prevent Congress from extending such rights in the federal territories. Vast
portions of land in the fledgling republic were not yet organized into states
and thus were under federal sovereignty. A majority of states—twenty-
seven out of fifty—began as territories during the nineteenth century.34
By jettisoning such restrictions in the territories, the federal government
facilitated immigrant settlement, which in turn contributed to the forma-
tion of communities accustomed to expansive rights for noncitizens.
To understand the significance of the extension of noncitizen prop-
erty rights to the territories, we must first examine the English legal tradi-
tion of restricting alien property ownership and its adoption in the states
after America gained independence. This section begins with an overview
of the English doctrine and its adoption in the states. It then describes the
debate over property and naturalization in the first Federal Congress. It
concludes with an examination of the creation of alien property rights in
the federal territories.
A. Alien Property in English Common Law
Courts in the fledging United States adopted various tenets of En-
glish common law, including alien property disabilities35—that is, restric-
tions on various property rights based on alienage. The idea of restricting a
foreigner’s access to land stemmed from the structure of feudalism itself.36
Under feudal land tenure, land was directly connected to allegiance.37 All
land was under the control of the monarch, who granted it to individuals
only upon assurances of their service to him. Such assurances took various
forms, typically either financial or military—as a landholder, you had a
duty to provide money, defense, or some other such service to the sover-
eign.38 The modern “citizen” did not exist; in a monarchy, all those owing
allegiance to the king were his subjects.39 Holding land was the privilege
of subjectship; those who were the subjects of another—say, the king of
34. See infra note 153.
35. Price, supra note 13, at 157.
36. 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF EN-
GLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 207–389 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1895) (discuss-
ing the structure of land tenure).
37. E.g., NORMAN ALEXANDER, RIGHTS OF ALIENS UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITU-
TION 101 (1931) [hereinafter ALEXANDER, RIGHTS OF ALIENS]  (“[D]uring the feudal era ac-
quisition of property involved the notion of allegiance to the prince.”).
38. JOSEPH SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 598–601 (5th
ed. 2010).
39. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 36, at 442.
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France—could not legally hold English lands.40 As an English legal scholar
later summarized:
By feudal law every tenant of lands owed fealty to the lord of
whom his lands were holden. In England the King is the ulti-
mate feudal lord and owner of all lands, and an alien owing
allegiance to a foreign prince was held incapable of taking the
oath of fealty which imposed obligations that might be incon-
sistent with the fidelity due to his own sovereign.41
From the feudal era until the late nineteenth century, then, aliens in
England could not legally inherit property or leave it to others upon death;
if they purchased property, they held it only so long as the King allowed.
Alien property disabilities also interacted with married women’s property
law: a woman who was an alien could be barred from receiving her
dower.42 Owners who attempted to sell, rent, or otherwise convey their
property to an alien would lose that property to the crown through forfei-
ture, since such a transaction would be “contrary to law.”43 As William
Blackstone noted in his Commentaries on the Law of England, a highly influ-
ential eighteenth-century treatise on English law, aliens were “disabled to
hold by purchase, except by the King’s license.”44 The ability to inherit or
devise property was not available to them, since they had no “inheritable
blood in them.”45 In this way, Blackstone noted, “they are on a level with
bastards.”46
Alien property disabilities grew out of a time not only of monarchical
rule, but also of perpetual allegiance: one could not hold dual or multiple
citizenships, and one’s allegiance was not a matter of choice.47 Subjectship
was not based on consent; it was based on duty. This notion extended
40. Id. (“An alien cannot hold land in England. If the person to whom land would de-
scend according to the common rules of inheritance, be an alien, it misses him and passes to
some remoter kinsman of the dead man. If, on the other hand, an alien obtains land by gift, sale,
lease, or the like, the transaction is not a nullity, but the king can seize the land and keep it for
himself.”).
41. H.S.Q. HENRIQUES, THE LAW OF ALIENS AND NATURALIZATION INCLUDING THE
TEXT OF THE ALIENS ACT, 1905, at 4 (1906).
42. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 172 (4th ed.
London, V. & R. Stevens and G.S. Norton 1853).
43. Id. at 351, 358.
44. Id. at 328.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See KENT, supra note 33, at 43 (“It is the doctrine of the English law, that natural born
subjects owe an allegiance, which is intrinsic and perpetual, and which cannot be divested by any
act of their own.”). On the doctrine of perpetual allegiance in American history, see Peter J.
Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship, 46 EMORY L. J. 1411, 1457–58 (1997).
12 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 19:1
beyond property law; for example, prior to the seventeenth century, aliens
were unable to sue in English courts.48
There were exceptions to the rule against alien property ownership,
however. Some foreigners were granted the status of denizen, if the sover-
eign chose to extend it.49 Denization empowered aliens to hold a life estate
in real property; they were then able to devise the property, but only to
after-born children.50 As English legal historians Frederick Pollack and
Frederic Maitland explain, “A denizen thus made can hold land, and he
can acquire land by gift, sale or the like, but he can not inherit, and a child
of his born before the act of denization can not inherit from him.”51 Alien
merchants were granted some exceptions so that they could rent property
for their trade.52
To be sure, the concerns underlying restrictions on property owner-
ship were not just structural; they were also political. Foremost among
these political concerns was fear of foreign invasion. Blackstone admitted
that the reasons for alien disabilities were not “strictly feudal,” but were
also based on “a principle of national or civil policy.”53 In other words,
“[i]f lands had been suffered to fall into their hands who own no alle-
giance to the crown, the design of introducing our feuds, the defence of
the kingdom, would have been defeated.”54 According to this view, alien
landholding was a threat not only to the land tenure system, which de-
pended on ties of loyalty, but also to the kingdom itself.
In the American colonies, alien disabilities “mirrored those of En-
gland”55 and were sustained in the courts. There were some exceptions;
some colonial governments enacted laws to exempt certain aliens at certain
times from the operation of the common law rules.56 Land laws were not
always uniformly prosecuted. Some aliens did hold land and passed it on to
their heirs, since they were not challenged by competing heirs and govern-
ments did not act to dispossess them. This left many Americans confused as
to the state of the common law, with some assuming that aliens were able
48. HENRIQUES, supra note 41, at 2.
49. BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at 392; see also 1 WILLIAM BURGE, COMMENTARIES ON
COLONIAL AND FOREIGN LAWS GENERALLY, AND IN THEIR CONFLICT WITH EACH OTHER,
AND WITH THE LAW OF ENGLAND 726–30 (London, Saunders & Benning, 1838) (“Denization
is conferred by letters patent of the king, and is a high and incommunicable branch of the royal
prerogative.”).
50. James E. Pfander & Theresa R. Wardon, Reclaiming the Immigration Constitution of the
Early Republic: Prospectivity, Uniformity and Transparency, 96 VA. L. REV. 369, 376 (2010); BLACK-
STONE, supra note 42, at 329.
51. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 36, at 443.
52. Id. at 442.
53. BLACKSTONE, supra note 42, at 328.
54. Id.
55. Price, supra note 13, at 158.
56. Id.
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to hold land.57 Yet for the most part, the English common law rules re-
garding alien property were adopted wholesale in the colonies and in the
states after independence. Because of this common law tradition, the
United States and Great Britain specifically made an exception to the rules
governing alien land ownership in the 1794 Jay Treaty, which ensured that
British citizens in the fledgling American republic would be able to hold
land as natives rather than as aliens.58
Common law alien property restrictions continued well into the
nineteenth century.59 The first treatise of American law, James Kent’s
Commentaries on American Law, recited various forms of alien disabilities in
property ownership. An alien, wrote Kent, “cannot acquire a title to real
property by descent, or created by other mere operation of law.”60 An
alien, even in the United States in the 1830s, was “exposed to the danger
of being divested of the fee, and of having his lands forfeited to the
state.”61 Tellingly, Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts stated in an 1834
case that the rule against alien inheritance was “among the first principles
of the law of real property.”62
While alien property disabilities persisted, many other elements of
English property law that were imported to the colonies did not survive
into the nineteenth century.63 Tenurial obligations gave way to land held
in fee simple, while various forms of related intangible property—like that
in offices or common lands—disappeared.64 The doctrine of primogeni-
57. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1109 (1790) (noting that Rep. Tucker “conceived it
the policy of America to enable foreigners to hold lands, in their own right”).
58. Treaty of Amity Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19, 1794, art. 9,
reprinted in 2 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 253–54 (Hunter Miller ed. 1931). The treaty stated, in part:
It is agreed, that British Subjects who now hold Lands in the Territories of the
United States, and American Citizens who now hold Lands in the Dominions of
His Majesty, shall continue to hold them according to the nature and Tenure of
their respective Estates and Titles therein, and may grant Sell or Devise the same to
whom they please, in like manner as if they were Natives; and that neither they
nor their Heirs or assigns shall, so far as may respect the said Lands, be and the
legal remedies incident thereto, be regarded as Aliens.
Id.
59. See, e.g., THE STATE HIST. SOC’Y OF WIS., THE CONVENTION OF 1846 (Milo M.
Quaife ed., 1919) [hereinafter WIS. CONVENTION OF 1846] (“By the common law an alien
cannot hold his realty.”).
60. KENT, supra note 33, at 53.
61. Id. at 61.
62. Slater v. Nason, 32 Mass. (1 Pick.) 345, 350 (1849).
63. The demise of the land tenure system and feudal obligations is recounted in STUART
BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF HOW, WHY, AND WHAT WE OWN 21
(2011).
64. Id. at 12.
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ture was replaced by state statutes allowing for the equal distribution of
land, and the fee tail was eliminated.65 Coverture was pushed into near
oblivion by married women’s property acts. All these practices were
judged to be feudal relics, not suited to a modern republic with plentiful
lands and an aversion to entrenched aristocracy.66 Lawyers in the nine-
teenth century described “a complete revolution”67 in property law, not-
ing that there had been “almost total change in the system of laws relative
to property.”68 As Stuart Banner notes, “[t]he old conceptual structure of
land ownership had vanished.”69
Alien property disabilities were a glaring exception to this trend.
They remained in American common law after the Revolution and per-
sisted into the nineteenth century. Indeed, they still exist in many states.70
The persistence of these disabilities well into the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries is all the more striking given that England, from whence the
tradition came, granted full property rights to aliens in 1870, overturning
all prior common law restrictions.71 Historian Polly Price argues that xen-
ophobia is at the root of this persistence in American law. These property
disabilities “withstood differing social forces that affected other common-
law property doctrines” because of an enduring “fear of aliens.”72 Judges
resisted alterations in common law practices despite strong economic and
social forces pointing towards the expansion of alien land rights.
Some states resisted this xenophobia and began to change the law
through statute during this period.73 Kent noted in 1836 that several states,
including Maryland, Kentucky, Ohio, Delaware, New York, and Massa-
chusetts, had passed laws enabling a “natural born subjects” to inherit from
65. Id. at 21. On the end of the entail, see Claire Priest, Creating an American Property Law:
Alienability and its Limits in American History, 120 HARV. L. REV. 385, 394 (2006).
66. See ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY, supra note 24, at 168–70.
67. James Humphreys, Law of Real Property, in 1 AMERICAN JURIST 58, 98 (1829).
68. St. George Tucker, The Editor’s Preface of 1 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, at iii, x
(1803).
69. BANNER, supra note 63, at 6.
70. See Tirres, supra note 1, at 97–101; Price, supra note 13, at 152–53; NATIONAL ASSO-
CIATION OF REALTORS, ALIEN LAND OWNERSHIP GUIDE (2006).
71. The British Naturalization Act of 1870 declared that “real and personal property of
every description may be taken, acquired, held, and disposed of by an alien in the same manner
in all respects as by a natural-born British subject.” Naturalization Act, 1870, 33 Vict., ch. 14,
§ 2 (Eng.). One remaining statutory restriction at this time prevented aliens from owning British
ships, but they were otherwise “under no incapacity by common law” to own property. HOW-
ARD WARBURTON ELPHINSTONE & JAMES W. CLARK, GOODEVE’S MODERN LAW OF PER-
SONAL PROPERTY 418 (London, Sweet and Maxwell, Ltd. 1892).
72. Price, supra note 13, at 205.
73. See BURGE, supra note 49, at 726–30 (summarizing state statutes regarding alien prop-
erty). Burge, writing in 1838, observes that “[i]n some of the states aliens are not subject to any
disabilities, in others, the greatest facility is afforded them, and again, in others, the common law
disabilities of aliens are retained.” Id. at 726.
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an alien parent.74 A few had apparently removed all prohibitions on alien
property ownership via statute, while others had done so only for those
aliens who took an oath of allegiance and pledged that they would natural-
ize as soon as possible.75 Yet when delegates met in the 1840s to draft state
constitutions in Iowa, Wisconsin, Michigan, and California, these statu-
tory provisions merited little mention. Instead, delegates spoke most force-
fully of a different legal basis for expanding rights: federal law governing
the territories.76 Thus, only by understanding the property scheme created
by federal land policy can we understand states’ creation of constitutional
property rights for noncitizens.
B. Property and Naturalization
Members of the first Congress were clearly aware that such alien disa-
bilities in property ownership existed in the common law. As Representa-
tive Smith of South Carolina noted in 1790, “[B]y the laws of this
country, it is generally understood that aliens cannot hold real estate.”77
Members considered disrupting this scheme by granting property rights
before naturalization, as a matter of federal law.78 Ultimately, federalism
concerns won out: representatives decided that only states could determine
the property rights of noncitizens within their borders.79 Members of
Congress instead encouraged migration by crafting a federal naturalization
policy that would enable aliens to achieve citizenship—and thus land own-
ership—relatively quickly. And, as the next section will explain, they
placed no bars to alien purchase and ownership of federal lands.80
Naturalization, property, and the national interest were intimately re-
lated in the eyes of the founders. The framers of the Constitution believed
that immigration was of vital importance to the future of the colonies and,
later, of the fledgling republic.81 This dynamic was aptly summed up by
Daniel Defoe in the early eighteenth century: “[T]he more people, the
more trade; the more trade, the more money; the more money, the more
strength; and the more strength, the greater the nation.”82 English controls
on naturalization were a significant factor leading to rebellion, and the
framers clearly expressed their frustration with the King’s onerous naturali-
74. KENT, supra note 33, at 55–56.
75. Id. at 68–70.
76. See discussion infra Parts II.C, II.D.
77. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1068 (1790).
78. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 108–112 and accompanying text.
80. See infra Part II.C.
81. On the relationship between federal policy and migration, see generally, ZOLBERG,
supra note 21.
82. DANIEL STATT, FOREIGNERS AND ENGLISHMEN: THE CONTROVERSY OVER IMMI-
GRATION AND POPULATION, 1660–1760, at 49 (1995).
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zation laws in the Declaration of Independence. The King, they com-
plained, “has endeavored to prevent the population of these States; for that
purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to
pass others to encourage their migrations hither, and raising the conditions
of new Appropriations of Lands.”83 Without a steady influx of immigrants,
the colonies would have difficulty maintaining a presence and establishing
new ground in the New World.
Between the 1783 signing of the Treaty of Peace and the 1788 ratifi-
cation of the Constitution, the states issued their own naturalization laws.
The requirements for naturalization in these laws were remarkably lax.84
Essentially, states used their naturalization laws as a means of competing for
migrants, which led to some frustration and dissatisfaction among law-
yers.85 By the time of the ratification of the Constitution, there was gen-
eral agreement that the power to craft a law of naturalization should belong
to the federal government alone.86 “Widespread acceptance of the argu-
ment for a national standard,” note James Pfander and Theresa Wardon,
“made the transfer of naturalization power to the new federal government
one of the least controversial features of the new Constitution.”87 The
federal Constitution thus granted Congress the power to draft “an uniform
law of Naturalization” for the entire country.88
The first federal naturalization law, enacted by Congress in 1790,
made citizenship available to “free white persons” who had resided in the
United States for two years and in the state where they sought naturaliza-
tion for one.89 Applicants also had to demonstrate “good moral character”
and pledge to support the Constitution.90 These were the only
requirements.
Noticeably, the naturalization law enacted in 1790 made no mention
of alien property rights; however, the issue of land ownership figured
prominently in the debates leading to its adoption.91 Members were united
in their assumption that land and migration were intimately related, and
83. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 9 (U.S. 1776).
84. See ZOLBERG, supra note 21, at 79; see also RANA, supra note 21, at 5960 (noting the
“lax naturalization policies” promoted in the American colonies).
85. Pfander & Wardon, supra note 21, at 383.
86. Id. at 385.
87. Id.
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
89. Naturalization Law of March 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (1790) (repealed by Act of
January 29, 1975).
90. Id.
91. Debates in the House of Representatives during this era were recorded for posterity;
the official record of the debates is published in the Annals of Congress. Senate debates were not
recorded, since the Senate met in secret during its first six years. Historians therefore rely on
unofficial sources, like the diaries and notes of senators themselves, in order to reconstruct the
debates. See The Diary of William Maclay, supra note 33, at xi–xiii.
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they discussed this dynamic repeatedly. Representative Lawrence of New
York opined, “The reason of admitting foreigners to the rights of citizen-
ship among us is the encouragement of emigration, as we have a large tract
of country to people.”92 Representative Page of Virginia plainly recog-
nized the relationship between land, naturalization, and migration: every
man who takes the oath of allegiance and intends to reside in the United
States, he said, “ought to be enabled to purchase and hold lands, or we
shall discourage many of the present inhabitants of Europe from becoming
inhabitants of the United States.”93
Attentive to the relationship between property rights and settlement,
some members proposed including clauses in the federal naturalization law
that would explicitly ensure such rights.94 An early version of the act
would have allowed aliens to own land after one year of residence and to
hold elective office after two years, even before naturalization.95 What
members called the “progressive”96 granting of rights over time (that is,
the piecemeal granting of rights, such as voting and property ownership,
prior to naturalization) received support among representatives for a num-
ber of different reasons. Members were in general agreement that alien
property disabilities were an impediment to the growth of the republic,
and some predicted their eventual demise.97
Even those who were in favor of strict naturalization requirements
seemed sanguine about removing restrictions on property ownership, es-
pecially for resident aliens.98 Representative Seney, for example, preferred
92. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1111 (1790) (comments of Rep. Lawrence).
93. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1115 (comments of Rep. Page).
94. See, e.g., The Diary of William Maclay, supra note 33, at 214 (citing Maclay’s support
for an amendment to “enable Aliens to hold lands in the United States.”).
95. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1109 (summarizing bill).
96. On the “progressive” granting of rights, see, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1119 (com-
ments of Rep. Jackson) (“It was observed yesterday . . . that we could not modify or confine our
terms of naturalization; that we could not admit an alien to the rights of citizenship progressively.
I shall take the liberty of supporting the contrary doctrine . . . that [in England], not only that
citizens are made progressively, but that such a mode is absolutely necessary to be pursued in
every act of Parliament for the naturalization of foreigners.”); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1116 (com-
ments of Rep. Tucker) (“[N]o doubt the Government had a right to make the admission to
citizenship progressive.”). This idea of granting rights progressively, prior to naturalization, was
similar to the notion of denization––a status in between alien and citizen––in England and in
European countries. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 392 (1765); MICHAEL RAPPORT, NATIONALITY AND CITIZENSHIP IN REVOLUTION-
ARY FRANCE 48 (2000).
97. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1110 (comments of Rep. Page) (arguing that distinc-
tions based on alienage were not appropriate in the United States “where a more liberal system
ought to prevail.”); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1113 (comments of Rep. Hartley) (noting that he had
“no objection” to a clause that would “enabl[e] foreigners to acquire and hold lands on a quali-
fied tenure.”).
98. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1118 (1790) (comments of Rep. Smith) (approving a
clause that would “let foreigners, on easy terms, be admitted to hold lands” but objecting to a
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significant residence requirements for political office-holding, but had “no
objection to foreigners being admitted to hold property, without any pre-
vious residence.”99 Representative Clymer thought in terms of migration
by both people and money. He argued that “it might be good policy to
admit foreigners to purchase and hold lands in fee simple, without ever
coming to America; it would, perhaps, facilitate the borrowing of money
of Europeans, if they could take mortgages, and be secure.”100 Similarly,
Representative Smith of South Carolina argued for a separate clause to be
inserted in the naturalization law, one that would ensure land rights but
would not make them dependent on the other requirements of
naturalization.101
The “progressive” granting of property rights prior to naturalization
was unobjectionable in part because a few states had already granted prop-
erty rights to foreigners. The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, for ex-
ample, granted property rights to aliens who had declared their allegiance
to the state and allowed them to be elected to state office after two years as
“free denizen[s].”102 Senator Maclay cited Pennsylvania’s law with ap-
proval, noting that it had led to the state’s success in attracting migrants.103
He encouraged fellow members to model the national law on Penn-
sylvania’s precedent.104
bill with minimal residency requirements for naturalization); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1119 (com-
ments of Rep. Stone) (“A foreigner who comes here . . . is desirous of obtaining and holding
property. I should have no objection to his doing this, from the first moment he sets foot on
shore in America; but it appears to me, that we ought to be cautious how we admit emigrants to
the other privileges of citizenship.”).
99. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1122 (comments of Rep. Seney); see also 1 ANNALS OF CONG.
1109 (comments of Rep. Hartley) (arguing that the “right to purchase and hold lands” did not
have to be dependent on a residency requirement but that voting and office-holding, as well as
naturalization itself, should).
100. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1121 (comments of Rep. Clymer).
101. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1118 (comments of Rep. Smith) (“[T]he object of his col-
league was nothing more than to let foreigners, on easy terms, be admitted to hold lands; that
this object could be better effectuated by introducing a clause to that purpose.”).
102. PENN. CONST. of 1776, § 42. The Constitution stated:
Every foreigner of good character who comes to settle in this state, having first
taken an oath or affirmation of allegiance to the same, may purchase, or by other
just means acquire, hold, and transfer land or other real estate; and after one year’s
residence, shall be deemed a free denizen thereof, and entitled to all the rights of a
natural born subject of this state, except that he shall not be capable of being
elected a representative until after two years residence.
Id.
103. The Diary of William Maclay, supra note 33, at 220 (“The fact is the adoption of
Strangers has set Pennsylvania far ahead of her Sister States”).
104. Id. at 222 (“For our parts we wished the naturalization bill to be in exact conformity
as possible to the existing Laws relating to aliens, in Pennsylvania.”); see also 1 ANNALS OF CONG.
1121 (comments of Rep. Clymer) (citing Pennsylvania’s law with approval).
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However, other legislators were uncomfortable with granting land
rights without a clear statement of allegiance; they argued that either natu-
ralization or some other indication that the alien intended to naturalize was
necessary.105 Representative Tucker thus proposed a compromise, stating
that he would permit the extension of land rights to recent immigrants,
but would make full title contingent on a three-year probationary pe-
riod.106 Three years seemed like enough, apparently, to demonstrate alle-
giance and an intent to remain.107
These proposals to guarantee alien property rights in federal law were
popular in principle but lost out to a broader, institutional concern. Legis-
lators argued that the federal government was not the proper creator nor
guarantor of such rights.108 Though the naturalization power belonged to
the federal government alone, it was the states, not Congress, that should
decide matters of property law and suffrage. They argued that rights of
property were properly creatures of state common law, not federal statute.
Senator Maclay recounted these arguments against federal grants of alien
property rights:
[T]he disability of an Alien to hold lands arose from the com-
mon law[ ] & was separable from the rights of Naturaliza-
tion . . . . When an alien therefore was enabled to hold real
Estate it was in reality by repealing part of the common law
with respect to him not by giving a power but taking away a
disability. It therefore strictly speaking rested, with the respec-
tive States whether they would repeal the common Law with
respect to Aliens touching the point of holding property and
being a pure State concern had no Occasion to be made any
mention of in the Naturalization Act but must remain to be
settled by the different States by Law . . . .109
The argument, then, was that rights could be granted “progressively”—that
is, prior to naturalization—but the appropriate grantor was the states, not
105. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1120 (1790) (comments of Rep. Huntington).
106. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1124 (explaining that Rep. Tucker “would withdraw, and pro-
pose to new model the clause, so as to allow aliens to be admitted to so much of the rights of
citizenship as to be able to hold lands, upon taking the necessary oaths,” but “with a proviso, that
the titles to real estates should not be valid, unless they continued to reside for the term of three
years in America”). As part of this proposal, he suggested a three-year residency requirement for
voting and standing for office. Id.
107. On the role of declarations of intent in immigration and nationality law, see generally
MOTOMURA, supra note 21.
108. See, e.g., The Notes of William Paterson, supra note 33, at 494 (“[T]enure and pro-
tection of property belong to each state”); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1123 (comments of Rep.
Smeney commenting) (“We can go no further than to prescribe the rule by which it can be
determined who are, and who are not citizens; but we cannot say they shall be entitled to
privileges in the different States.”).
109. The Diary of William Maclay, supra note 33, at 221.
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the federal government. As Senator Patterson reflected in his record of the
proceedings, “We can make a Citizen; we cannot do less.”110 The final
version of the first naturalization law thus made no mention of alien prop-
erty or political rights, leaving those for the states to decide.111 Naturaliza-
tion was a federal matter, but property and suffrage qualifications
ultimately belonged in state law.112
The debates over the first naturalization law reveal that members of
Congress were aware of alien land restrictions and that they sought to limit
the effect of common law disabilities on migrants’ willingness to settle.
They did so not by guaranteeing these rights as a federal matter, but in-
stead by crafting a relatively short and simple path to naturalization. Once
naturalized, of course, foreign-born residents had the same property rights
as all other citizens.
Thus the federal government’s control over naturalization did not
translate into control over most other alien rights, which remained the
province of the states. The situation was strikingly different, however,
within those parts of the United States that were not yet fully incorporated
into the union: the federal territories. When it came to governing the
territories, the federal government had a much more expansive role to play
in the realms of property law and alien rights.
C. Federal Land Policy and the Territories
With independence and the signing of the Treaty of Peace in 1783,
the American colonies gained not only their own freedom but also control
over vast landholdings to the West.113 The fledgling state of Virginia ceded
control of the Northwest Territory to the federal government in 1784; this
is known as the Virginia cession. The ceded territory covered what would
later become the states of Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and parts
of modern-day Ohio and Minnesota.114 Over the course of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, these landholdings would grow. The United
States acquired more acreage due to a variety of factors, including cessions
110. The Notes of William Paterson, supra note 33, at 494.
111. See Naturalization Law of March 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (1790) (repealed by Act
of January 29, 1975).
112. The regulation of property continues to be primarily the domain of states. See, e.g.,
ALEXANDER, RIGHTS OF ALIENS, supra note 37, at 98 (“[T]he rules and conditions pertaining
to the ownership of property are in the main within the jurisdiction of the several states.”);
Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1, 22 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(acknowledging “state law as the traditional source of . . . real property interests”); Sei Fujii v.
State, 242 P.2d 617, 626 (Cal. 1952) (“Congress regulates admission to citizenship, not owner-
ship of property.”). The federal government does have presumptive control over intellectual
property and over federally-owned property. See Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, Of
Property and Federalism, 115 YALE L.J. 72, 74 n.1 (2005).
113. MARK STEIN, HOW THE STATES GOT THEIR SHAPES 1 (2008).
114. Id. at 1–2.
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by other states in the 1790s, the acquisition of the Southwest Territory in
1790, the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, and the Mexican cession in 1848.115
Congress first faced the question of how to settle and govern these
landholdings in 1784, with regard to the Virginia cession lands. Early on,
Congress determined that these landholdings would eventually be incor-
porated as states of the new republic after divisions of each particular terri-
tory met certain population and governance requirements.116 However,
how to put the land in the hands of settlers was a different, thornier ques-
tion. Congress decided not to follow the approach common in European
countries, where a sovereign would grant land to a wealthy proprietor,
who would then divvy it up amongst settlers.117 Instead, Congress aimed
to put land directly in the hands of settlers.
This approach was first formulated as part of the Land Ordinances of
1784 and 1785.118 These laws created a market for public lands, using the
public land survey system developed by Thomas Jefferson. In crafting the
Land Ordinances, Congress intentionally sought to exclude certain buyers
from the market. The Ordinances discouraged purchase by squatters (those
already living on the land), land speculators (those who would purchase
vast acres simply to raise prices and resell), and those of modest means by
limiting the total acreage one person could purchase, parceling out the
acreage in large, discrete sections, and charging a relatively high minimum
purchase price.119
Congressional disdain for speculators and squatters is a familiar story;
less well known is the extent to which federal land policy depended on a
specific vision of foreign settlement. Foreigners featured prominently in
congressional debates and official correspondence as likely, and desired,
purchasers of the federal lands.120 Lawmakers imagined an influx of White
European migrants who would, they thought, contribute to the republic’s
White, Christian character.121
115. Id. at 1–10.
116. ZOLBERG, supra note 21, at 68.
117. See id. at 67 (noting that “the revolutionary generation adamantly rejected [land]
grants as a path to aristocratic corruption”).
118. See generally PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE
NORTHWEST ORDINANCE 21–43 (1987); ZOLBERG, supra note 21, at 66–69.
119. See ONUF, supra note 118, at 30 (“The cost of federal lands under the 1785 land
ordinance would block out poor, lazy squatters; instead, the territory would attract industrious
settlers determined to recoup their investment by developing their property and finding markets
for their products.”). But, by 1817, Congress had lowered the required acreage from 160 to 80 in
some areas. ZOLBERG, supra note 21, at 118.
120. See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to the President of Cong. (Aug. 22, 1785),
in THE WRITINGS OF WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES,
1745–1799, at 231 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1988) (noting that the West would “more than
probably . . . be composed in a great degree of Foreigners”).
121. Of course, not all Europeans were considered desirable. Benjamin Franklin, for exam-
ple, was “suspicious” of German immigrants in particular. Glenn Weaver, Benjamin Franklin and
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Cognizant of the connection between granting land rights and in-
ducing immigration, Congress abandoned common law property restric-
tions on aliens in the market for public lands. The Land Ordinances placed
no restrictions on purchase or ownership by noncitizens.122 As an observer
noted in 1909, “In the acts offering the public lands for sale no require-
ment has been made of citizenship, or even declaration of intentions [to
naturalize]. Such lands have been offered on the same terms to all irrespec-
tive of their allegiance.”123 Because the territories were federal property,
the state common law restrictions were understood not to apply, at least as
long as the territories remained under federal jurisdiction.
This move to jettison alien property disabilities caused some debate.
As the first plots of land were sold in the territories in the 1790s, some
representatives in Congress expressed concern about foreigners purchasing
land in the same way as citizens. Representative Smith of South Carolina,
for example, noted that one prospective purchaser, Hannibal Dobbyn, “is
avowedly an alien.”124 Sale to Mr. Dobbyn presented a problem since, as
Smith noted, the states adhered to the common law doctrine prohibiting
alien ownership of real estate.125 Smith thought it would be “a solecism in
Government to encourage or countenance the holding of land by such a
tenure.”126 Representative Baldwin, however, countered with his own in-
terpretation of the relationship between the federal government and the
states:
There has been some difficulty suggested, whether, by the
common law, which is adopted in the several States, an alien
can hold real estate in this country. If the common law excludes
aliens from possessing lands in their own right, be it
remembered that we have not adopted the common law, and
therefore are free from its restraints.127
the Pennsylvania Germans, 14 WM. & MARY Q. 536, 536 (1957). The Alien and Sedition Acts are
another example of congressional animus towards even those of White, Christian identity.
122. The Land Ordinances of 1784 and 1785 made no specifications about the identity of
the purchaser––unlike land laws that followed in the nineteenth century, such as the Homestead
Act. Unfortunately, the legislative history of the Ordinances of 1784 and 1785 is limited due to
the lack of records of congressional debate. See PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND
LAW DEVELOPMENT 64 (1968).
123. Samuel MacClintock, Aliens Under the Federal Laws of the United States, 4 ILL. L. REV.
27, 27 (1910).
124. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1068 (1790).
125. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1068.
126. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1068.
127. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1071.
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In other words, Congress was not bound by state common law. Baldwin’s
perspective carried the day: ultimately, no alienage restrictions were placed
on federal public land purchase until the late nineteenth century.128
In addition to granting land rights, congressional plans for settlement
of the Western territories also included political rights. Such rights were
guaranteed both in The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which laid the
groundwork for governance of the territories and their eventual admission
to the union, and also in subsequent ordinances and organic acts that gov-
erned additional territories in the West.129 Residents in the territories
could form a governing legislature and petition for statehood once the
population reached a specific number of “free inhabitants.”130 Congress
intentionally used the word “inhabitant” rather than “citizen” here. The
Ordinance enabled aliens to count not only towards the requisite popula-
tion numbers, but also as voters: section nine stated that noncitizens could
cast a vote for their representatives as long as they had a freehold interest in
fifty acres of land and two years of residence in the district.131 Office-
holding was extended to noncitizens, as well; they were qualified to run
for office as long as they had three years of residence in the district and a
freehold interest in 200 acres.132
The principles of the Northwest Ordinance were eventually ex-
tended, via congressional enactments and enabling acts, to all other territo-
ries acquired in the nineteenth century, including lands gained through
the Louisiana Purchase and the Mexican cession.133 In combination, the
Northwest Ordinance and the land ordinances provided a strong founda-
tion for noncitizen rights—to both property ownership and the vote—in
all of the federal territories.134
128. See discussion infra Part IV.
129. See An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States, North-
West of the river Ohio (Northwest Ordinance), 1 Stat. 51 (1787); ONUF, supra note 118; Mat-
thew J. Hegreness, Note, An Organic Law Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: The Northwest
Ordinance as the Source of Rights, Privileges, and Immunities, 120 YALE L. J. 1820 (2011) (tracing the
significant influence of the Ordinance, and its extension to other territories in later organic acts,
on the states that came under its ambit).
130. Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. 51, art. 5.
131. Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. 51.
132. Id.
133. Hegreness, supra note 129, at 1830, 1843–54 (“[T]he principles in the [Northwest]
Ordinance were incorporated into the organic law of almost all of the territories before the Civil
War as well as many of the states formed in the territories.”). Hegreness does not address the
dissemination of the alien suffrage clause in the Northwest Ordinance; his focus is instead on
what he calls the “core privileges and immunities,” most of which are in the ordinance’s “Arti-
cles of Compact.” Id. at 1840–43.
134. There were some land laws that specifically applied to particular territories, such as
the Donation Land Act of 1850, which applied to the Oregon Territory. 9 Stat. 496 (1850).
These territory-specific laws, like the 1785 Land Ordinance, continued to allow for unfettered
purchase and ownership by noncitizens. See id.
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Though various components of territorial law came under fire, par-
ticularly the provisions outlawing slavery,135 expansive land policies re-
mained. Federal preemption laws, which allowed squatters to make legal
claims to land, enabled noncitizen claims. The Preemption Acts of the
1830s allowed “any settler or occupant,” regardless of citizenship, to claim
lands that he or she had improved.136 The Preemption Act of 1841 allowed
preemptive claims by noncitizens who had filed declarations of intent to
naturalize.137 The declaration of intent could be filed immediately upon
arrival in the country; it was the first step towards naturalization, which
could be achieved under the Naturalization Act of 1795 after five years of
residency.138 This language of declarant eligibility was also used in the
1850 Donation Land Claim Act, which allowed homesteading in the Ore-
gon Territory.139 The Homestead Act of 1862, like the Donation Act,
granted homesteads not only to citizens but also to those who had declared
their intent to become citizens.140 There was a key limitation, however:
title would not vest in the declarant noncitizen until he had naturalized.141
The ability of aliens to purchase federal land remained free of either
naturalization or declaration of intent requirements; as the Attorney Gen-
135. See, e.g., PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN
THE AGE OF JEFFERSON 38–39 (2d ed., 2001).
136. 4 Stat. 420 (1830) (opening the possibility of a preemption claim to “every settler or
occupant” in possession of public lands). On the preemption laws, see EVERETT DICK, THE
LURE OF THE LAND 50–69 (1970); MALCOLM J. ROHRBOUGH, THE LAND OFFICE BUSINESS
161–176 (1990).
137. § 10, 5 Stat. 452, 455 (1841).
138. See Naturalization Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414 (1795) (repealed by Act of
April 14, 1802) (requiring that immigrants file a declaration of intent three years before admis-
sion as a naturalized citizen); PRENTISS WEBSTER, LAW OF NATURALIZATION IN THE UNITED
STATES AND IN OTHER COUNTRIES 54 (Little Brown, 1895) (noting that the declaration could
be filed upon arrival or at a later time, but that at least two years must have elapsed between
declaration and the application for naturalization); Peter J. Spiro, Questioning Barriers to Naturali-
zation, 13 GEO. IMM. L. J. 479, 509 (1999). Declarations of intent were removed as a require-
ment of naturalization in 1952. Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 334(f), 66
Stat. 163, 254–55 (1952).
139. Land Donation Act of 1850, ch. 76, § 4, 9 Stat. 496–97 (1850).
140. It provided:
[A]ny person who is the head of a family, or who has arrived at the age of
twenty-one years, and is a citizen of the United States, or who shall have filed his
declaration of intention to become such, as required by the naturalization laws of
the United States, and who has never borne arms against the United States Gov-
ernment or given aid and comfort to its enemies, shall, from and after the first
January, eighteen hundred and sixty-three, be entitled to enter one quarter section
or a less quantity of unappropriated public lands . . . .
Homestead Act of 1862, ct. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862).
141. Id. The Act stated that title could vest after five years of occupation if the homesteader
was “at that time a citizen of the United States” and if he or she (for widows could ripen a claim
as well) could prove occupation and improvement of the land.
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eral wrote in an opinion regarding an 1854 land law, “But what is there in
the act to forbid the alien to purchase . . . in open competition with all the
world, as he may other public lands? I do not perceive anything.”142
Over time, then, the land ordinances and the Northwest Ordinance
created a federal policy of alien property and political rights. Aliens’ rights
to purchase and possess public lands were at times challenged, but such
challenges were largely unsuccessful. Only the 1840s declarant requirement
for preemption grants limited the rights initially implemented by these or-
dinances.143 Not until 1887 would Congress prohibit alien purchase of
public lands, and that prohibition was significantly qualified by an excep-
tion allowing noncitizens who had filed declarations of intent to
purchase.144
Territorial governments did not have to abide by the demands of the
ordinances once they became states; with statehood, they gained sover-
eignty over voting qualifications and procedures within their jurisdic-
tion.145 Most of the territories received large grants of federal land upon
their admission to the Union, and state governments had power to define
the property rights relating to these grants of land, as well as those relating
to properties that had already been purchased in the state.146 Newly-ad-
mitted states could have decided to abandon alien property rights and alien
suffrage. Yet many of these states continued to provide aliens with more
expansive rights.147 Federal law thus set the stage for these immigrant-
friendly state policies, both by creating communities accustomed to nonci-
tizen rights and, as we will see in Part II, by encouraging the settlement of
aliens themselves, who could then expend political power in territorial
legislatures and, ultimately, constitutional conventions. The following sec-
142. 7 U.S. Op. Att’y. Gen. 351, 354 (1855).
143. Daniel Feller notes that land policy remained remarkably constant, even during the
era of reform in the 1830s and 1840s. DANIEL FELLER, THE PUBLIC LANDS IN JACKSONIAN
POLITICS 194–95 (1984).
144. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 340, 24 Stat. 476 (1887); see discussion infra note 294.
145. The federal government retained control over public lands in the states that exper-
ienced a territorial phase, but the new states were otherwise supposed to be sovereign, “on an
equal footing as the original states.” Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. 51 (1787); see also ONUF,
supra note 118, at 67–68.
146. See GATES, supra note 122, at 285–318 (surveying grants state-by-state). Some grants
of land to the states were restricted for particular purposes, but states could in many cases decide
to use the lands differently. The federal government retained control over those federal public
lands not granted to the states, in all states except for the original 13 and Texas. Id. at 317.
147. A full survey of the position of aliens in all states that experienced territorial govern-
ment is outside the scope of this article. Others have discussed the prevalence, and continuation,
of alien suffrage in former territories. See, e.g., RON HAYDUK, DEMOCRACY FOR ALL: RE-
STORING IMMIGRANT VOTING RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 15–25 (noting that Congress
repeatedly sanctioned alien suffrage in the territories); ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO
VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 65 (rev. ed.,
2009); Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional, and Theoretical
Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1406–09 (1993).
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tion explores the influence of these federal policies on one phenomenon in
particular: the adoption of property rights for noncitizens in state
constitutions.
II. CRAFTING CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
FOR NONCITIZENS
In the nineteenth century, eleven states added provisions to their
state constitutions guaranteeing property rights for noncitizens. All but
two—West Virginia and California—were federal territories prior to at-
taining statehood. Two—Wisconsin and Michigan—were states formed
out of the Northwest Territory.148 Five—Arkansas, Colorado, South Da-
kota, Wyoming, and Iowa—were entirely or partially products of the 1803
Louisiana Purchase.149 California was part of the prize of the Mexican
cession in 1846.150 Finally, West Virginia was carved out of the state of
Virginia during the Civil War.151 Thus, before achieving statehood, the
majority of those states adopting constitutional property rights for nonci-
tizens were subject to federal land policies. This section focuses on the
antebellum adopters of alien land rights: Iowa (1846), Wisconsin (1848),
California (1849), and Michigan (1850).152 These four states were followed
by seven others after the Civil War.153
148. STEIN, supra note 113, at 2.
149. Id. at 2–5.
150. Id. at 5–6.
151. Id. at 6–7.
152. The convention debates for these four states can be found in the following sources: J.
ROSS BROWNE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA (D.C., J.T.
Towers 1850) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA DEBATES]; WIS. CONVENTION OF 1847, supra note 31;
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION TO REVISE THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN (Lansing, R.W. Ingals 1850) [hereinafter MICHIGAN
DEBATES]; BENJAMIN FRANKLIN SHAMBAUGH, THE STATE HISTORICAL SOC’Y OF IOWA,
FRAGMENTS OF THE DEBATES OF THE IOWA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS OF 1844 AND
1846 (Iowa City, State Historical Soc’y of Iowa 1900) [hereinafter FRAGMENTS OF THE IOWA
CONVENTIONS];  WIS. CONVENTION OF 1846, supra note 59.
153. Twenty-seven states experienced territorial law in the nineteenth century and also
became states in the nineteenth century. See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, U.S. Territory and
Statehood Status by Decade, 1790–1960, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.
census.gov/dataviz/visualizations/048/508.php. The states that constitutionalized alien property
rights in the nineteenth century were in the minority: ten of the adopters had experienced
territorial law (all but two, West Virginia and California, were organized territories at some
point in the nineteenth century). This does not mean, however, that these other states were not
amenable to alien property ownership. Some passed such laws via statute. See KENT, supra note
33, at 102, 107, 115. A full explication of these other states’ policies is beyond the scope of this
article. My exploration here focuses on explaining this moment of constitutionalizing alien prop-
erty rights. I argue that federal influence was a key factor. The fact that it was not uniformity
influential in all states governed by territorial law in the nineteenth century does not mean that it
was not influential in those states that did adopt these rights.
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There were key similarities among these four states. First, each was
sparsely populated; the extant populations were comprised in part by Na-
tive Americans, and in California, by Mexican Americans. Three of the
four states—Iowa, Wisconsin, and California—had only recently been ad-
mitted to the Union. In these states, alien property rights were included in
the first state constitutions. Michigan had been admitted as a state in 1837
and included an alien property rights provision in its 1850 constitution.154
Each of the four state governments were actively concerned with increas-
ing their state’s population, both to achieve the requisite numbers for state-
hood—in the case of Iowa, Wisconsin, and California—and to ensure a
prosperous future. Some lawmakers desired migration not only to increase
the population and wealth of the state, but also to oust Native American
and Mexican American residents. Alien land rights acted then, as they did
in the late eighteenth century, as a direct inducement to settlement and, by
extension, to Western conquest.155
The economic and political pressure to encourage immigration was
strong, but it was not the only factor leading to the inclusion of alien
property rights in state constitutions. Such provisions were also influenced
by the particular legal traditions of the territories, which diverged substan-
tially from that of the Eastern seaboard states. Wisconsin, Michigan, and
Iowa each had been governed prior to statehood by federal territorial law,
which, as Part I explained, granted noncitizens the same rights of property
as citizens. California had been a part of Spain and then Mexico prior to
statehood, and Mexican law, like most civil law systems in this era, did not
distinguish between citizens and aliens in property ownership.156 Federal
policy and the influence of Mexican law thus set the stage for alien rights
in the new states of the West.
This section begins by describing the transition from territory to
state and the important role of state constitutions in this process. It then
uses the state constitutional convention debates to flesh out the causes and
consequences of constitutionalizing alien property rights. In short, state
delegates transformed immigrant-friendly practices into constitutional law.
In doing so, they asserted and reinforced a particularly American concep-
tion of property, pursuing widespread, democratic land ownership. This
was in direct contrast to the aristocratic and feudal traditions of the English
common law, of which alien property disabilities were an important part.
A. From Territory to State: The Process of Creating Constitutions
The Northwest Ordinance laid out an orderly procedure for eventual
self-government of the lands covered by the act. Once a population
154. See MICH. CONST. OF 1850, art. 18, § 12.
155. See sources cited supra note 152.
156. See BURGE, supra note 49, at 697–98, 704 (noting the absence of alien property disa-
bilities in the civil law codes of Spain and France).
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reached five thousand male inhabitants, the residents could elect a territo-
rial legislature.157 This was the first step in territorial organization. Upon
reaching a population of sixty thousand free inhabitants, they could seek an
Enabling Act from Congress, allowing the territory to convene a constitu-
tional convention.158 The process was similar for lands gained through the
Louisiana Purchase, and Congress passed additional organic acts that ex-
tended the Northwest Ordinance principles to territories acquired later
on.159
Michigan, Iowa, and Wisconsin all shared a common territorial area.
Both Wisconsin and Iowa had been a part of the Michigan Territory,
which split off from the Illinois Territory when Illinois became a state in
1818. The Michigan Territory was a combination of lands gained through
the Virginia cession and the Louisiana Purchase. When Michigan became
a state in 1837, the remaining Michigan Territory lands were transferred to
the Wisconsin Territory.160 Iowa, then a part of the Wisconsin Territory,
was organized as a separate territory in 1838. The southeastern portion of
the Iowa Territory was admitted as the state of Iowa in 1846, and Wiscon-
sin followed in 1848.
Territorial organization, which started with the election of a territo-
rial legislature, provided a strong incentive for settlement. The population
of the Midwest grew rapidly in the 1830s and 1840s. The Wisconsin Ter-
ritory grew from an estimated three thousand persons in 1830 to more
than one hundred fifty-five thousand in 1846.161 The Iowa Territory grew
from a population of approximately twenty three thousand in 1838 to
more than eighty thousand by 1846.162 Michigan had a population of
more than two hundred thousand in 1840; this number would quadruple
by 1860.163
California followed a different path than the other three antebellum
adopters. In California, it was not territorial organization but gold that
caused an exponential jump in population and settlement.164 In 1846—at
157. Northwest Ordinance, § 14, 1 Stat. 51 (1787).
158. Id.
159. See Hegreness, supra note 129, at 1845–54.
160. Act of Aug. 6, 1846, ch. 89, 9 Stat. L. 56; Ray A. Brown, The Making of the Wisconsin
Constitution,1949 WIS. L. REV. 648, 654 n.23 (1949).
161. Brown, supra note 160, at 648–49.
162. Leonidas Goodwin, The American Occupation of Iowa, 1833 to 1860, 17 IOWA J. HIST.
& POL. 83, 89 (1919).
163. 2 HENRY M. UTLEY AND BYRON M. CUTCHEON, MICHIGAN AS A PROVINCE,
TERRITORY AND STATE, THE TWENTY-SIXTH MEMBER OF THE FEDERAL UNION 337 (1906);
MICHIGAN NONPROFIT ASSOCIATION & COUNCIL OF MICHIGAN FOUNDATIONS, MICHIGAN
IN BRIEF 2–3 (2002), available at http://www.michiganinbrief.org/edition07/Chapter1/Chap-
ter1.htm (last modified Apr. 1, 2002).
164. H.W. BRANDS, THE AGE OF GOLD: THE CALIFORNIA GOLD RUSH AND THE NEW
AMERICAN DREAM 23–24 (2003) (noting that the California gold rush “triggered the most
astonishing mass movement of peoples since the Crusades”).
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the conclusion of the U.S.-Mexico War—Mexico ceded California, as
well as all or most of present-day Arizona, Utah, Nevada, Colorado, New
Mexico, and Wyoming.165 Unlike the Midwestern states, California did
not go through a period of territorial governance. It was under military
control until it was admitted as a state in 1850, and state leaders held a
constitutional convention and ratified their constitution without the per-
mission of Congress.166 The state was thus never organized as a territory; it
skipped from the status of unorganized territory directly to statehood. Al-
though California differed from the other states mentioned in this respect,
it had a similar relation to federal land law: the land ordinances that gov-
erned federal public lands still applied in California, just as they did in the
other Western states (with the exception of Texas, which retained sover-
eignty over its public lands upon its admission as a state in 1845).167 Cali-
fornia, though, was also supposed to abide by the treaty provisions
established in 1848, which guaranteed the property rights of Mexican
landholders.168
When constitutional convention delegates met in these states in the
1840s and 1850s, they followed the requirements laid out in the federal
ordinances and treaties. They also had a sense of power and choice. As
legal scholar Christian Fritz shows, Western convention delegates in the
nineteenth century drew upon compilations of state constitutions, legal
treatises, and other materials as they drafted their own constitutions.169 In
many ways, these fledgling state constitutions were not much different
from previous late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century state constitu-
tions. They contained discrete sections: preamble and boundaries; a bill of
rights; and separate sections on legislative, judicial, and executive func-
165. LAURA E. DAVIS, MANIFEST DESTINIES: THE MAKING OF THE MEXICAN AMERICAN
RACE 4 (2008).
166. See DAVID ALAN JOHNSON, FOUNDING THE FAR WEST: CALIFORNIA, OREGON,
AND NEVADA, 1840–1890, at 23–31, 101–38 (1992).
167. GATES, supra note 122, at 303 (noting that Congress admitted California with an
express provision that “there should be no interference with the [federal] primary disposal of the
public lands”).
168. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement, U.S.-Mex., arts. XIII–IX, Feb. 2,
1848, 5 U.S.T. 217 [hereinafter Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo].
169. Christian G. Fritz, The American Constitutional Tradition Revisited: Preliminary Observa-
tions On State Constitution-Making in the Nineteenth-Century West, 25 RUTGERS L. J. 945, 975–83
(1994) [hereinafter Fritz, The American Constitutional Tradition Revisited] (“Virtually all state con-
ventions were influenced by earlier constitutions, constitutional experience, practice, and inter-
pretations.”); see also GORDON M. BAKKEN, ROCKY MOUNTAIN CONSTITUTION MAKING,
1850–1912, at 12 (1987) (“The tradition [in the Rocky Mountain states] was one of borrowed
provision and periodic innovation reflective of contemporary concerns.”).
30 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 19:1
tions.170 They generally addressed the same core topics. Delegates engaged
in “extensive borrowing,” Fritz writes, in both form and substance.171
Yet the constitutions they developed were not purely derivative. Del-
egates “still discussed and wrestled with constitutional ideas”; they com-
pared constitutions with an eye towards deciding what made the most
sense for their particular place and population.172 They differed quite sig-
nificantly in the range of additional topics covered. As Fritz and other
scholars have shown, delegates in the mid- to late-nineteenth century be-
gan a trend of constitutional legislation, meaning they were comfortable
incorporating regulations into their constitutions that might earlier have
been considered inappropriate.173 They embraced a far greater level of
specificity and detail, for better or worse. They also began to grant more
expansive rights than those granted by the federal Constitution (a trend
that continues today).174 These trends set the stage for careful attention to
and vigorous debate of property rights. Delegates felt empowered to con-
sider such rights outside of traditional common law restraints.
B. Of State Power and Alien Rights
Questions about the proper extent of alien civil rights featured prom-
inently in constitutional conventions in the states that emerged from the
Western territories. The rights of property and of suffrage were the two
primary concerns, and they were often interwoven.175 Delegate W.H.
Clark gave a stirring defense of alien suffrage in the Wisconsin debates of
1846: foreigners left the “ties of friendship, of kindred, and of home,” and
“came to America, paid their money into the treasury of the United States,
and became tenants of a large portion of the public domain, and have
therefore a common interest with and an attachment to the community
170. See Fritz, California’s First Bill of Rights, supra note 11, at 31 (describing the general
contours of mid-nineteenth century constitutions).
171. Fritz, The American Constitutional Tradition Revisited, supra note 169, at 981.
172. Id. See also Fritz, California’s First Bill of Rights, supra note 11, at 15 (“[T]he nine-
teenth century state constitutional conventions produced constitutions that reflected both conti-
nuities with eighteenth century American constitutionalism and the concerns of the age in
which they were created.”).
173. See generally Fritz, California’s First Bill of Rights, supra note 11.
174. See Kermit Hall, Mostly Anchor and Little Sail: The Evolution of American State Constitu-
tions, in TOWARD A USABLE PAST: LIBERTY UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS 388–89 (Paul
Finkelman & Stephen E. Gottlieb eds., 2009); G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CON-
STITUTIONS 97 (1998) (“[S]tate constitution-makers . . . came to view constitution making as a
progressive enterprise, requiring the constant readjustment of past practices and institutional ar-
rangements in light of changes in circumstance and political thought.”); CONSTITUTIONAL
POLITICS IN THE STATES: CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES AND HISTORICAL PATTERNS, at
xiii-xiv (G. Alan Tarr, ed., 1996).
175. See discussion infra Part III.B, at 149–51.
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and consequently the right of suffrage.”176 Land rights—first guaranteed
by federal land policy—ripened into political rights, in Clark’s view and
those of other supporters of alien suffrage.
But in order to grant political and property rights to noncitizens,
delegates had to agree it was within their power to do so. State convention
delegates understood that Congress retained the power to govern naturali-
zation, but some were uncertain about whether that naturalization power
controlled or restrained the states in their treatment of noncitizens.177
Delegate J.A. Barber of Wisconsin argued, for example, that in choosing
to grant suffrage to foreigners “we are exercising a power of naturalization
we do not possess, and violating the Constitution of the United States.”178
During the Iowa debates, one delegate argued that granting suffrage to
noncitizens would be a violation of the federal Constitution, “admitting
persons to privileges of citizenship, who had never renounced their alle-
giance to a foreign power.”179
However, those arguing that states had the power to grant nonci-
tizens more extensive rights were more persuasive. Delegates pointed out
that states had long regulated immigrants in various ways. Naturalization,
they conceded, was a federal prerogative, but the regulation of alien rights
prior to naturalization was left to the states.180 Granting civic and political
rights to foreigners was not a violation of federal government power over
naturalization, according to Wisconsin delegate George Ryan, but instead
“the simple and unquestionable exercise of a sovereign power which the
states have never surrendered, and which almost every state has in one way
or another continually exercised: the sovereign power of denization.”181
Barber agreed that aliens in the territory of Wisconsin were akin to
“denizens,” defined by Blackstone as “a person not a native or a natural-
ized citizen or subject, but occupying a middle space.”182 Barber noted
that foreigners in the Wisconsin Territory could “inherit, hold, and trans-
mit real estate,” hallmarks of denizenship.183
176. WIS. CONVENTION OF 1846, supra note 59, at 277 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). Clark based his argument for a membership based on community ties on Jefferson’s drafting
of the Virginia constitution, which extended the vote to “[a]ll men who have sufficient evi-
dence of a common interest in, and attachment to, the community . . . .” Id. at 276–77.
177. Id. at 275 (“Sentiments have been strongly entertained by many men . . . that to
confer the elective franchise upon the foreigner before he becomes a citizen of the United States
is in conflict with the naturalization laws thereof.”).
178. Id. at 236.
179. FRAGMENTS OF THE IOWA CONVENTIONS, supra note 152, at 45.
180. Not until the 1870s did Congress begin to assert its plenary power over immigration.
Even after this, states retained the power to set rules regarding the rights of aliens in their midst,
as long as those rules did not infringe upon the federal government’s enforcement of its ever-
expanding immigration regulation efforts.
181. WIS. CONVENTION OF 1846, supra note 59, at 254.
182. Id. at 236.
183. Id.
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Delegates found support for their arguments in favor of state power
over alien rights in other states’ laws. Two other states, North Carolina and
Pennsylvania, had granted full property rights to noncitizens in their 1776
constitutions.184 There were state statutes that permitted aliens to own
property, either in fee simple or with less onerous disabilities.185 Other
states and localities permitted aliens to vote.186 Wisconsin delegate Ryan
mentioned these statutory provisions in passing, when arguing for the
power of states to grant voting rights to noncitizens.187 He argued that,
based both on prior statutes and constitutional provisions, granting alien
suffrage was “no new thing, no unsanctioned thing, no unusual thing, no
unauthorized thing. It is the simple exercise, in one form, of a power
which almost all the states appear to exercise in some form.”188
Some delegates considered legislation a more appropriate place than a
state constitution to deal with land rights, but this was a minority view.189
As one delegate argued, “[c]ircumstances might occur which would
render a modification of these rights necessary, and the legislature could
then restrict them.”190 Placing such rights in the constitution prohibited
the legislature and courts from rescinding them at a later date.
Some delegates argued that not only could they extend property
rights to noncitizens, they had to do so because of federal precedent in the
territories, or, in the case of California, because of the treaty guarantees.191
As the next two sections explain, these arguments proceeded from both
retrospective and prospective points of view. In other words, delegates
wanted to promote future immigration to the state via land rights, but they
also wanted to protect the ownership rights of those residents who had
184. PENN. CONST. of 1776, § 42 (“Every foreigner of good character who comes to settle
in this state, having first taken an oath or affirmation of allegiance to the same, may purchase, or
by other just means acquire, hold, and transfer land or other real estate.”); N.C. CONST. OF
1776, § 40, reprinted in THE AMERICAN’S GUIDE 190 (Hogan & Thompson, 1835) (“That every
foreigner who comes to settle in this state, having first taken an oath of allegiance to the same,
may purchase, or, by other just means, acquire, hold, and transfer land, or other real estate, and
after one year’s residence be deemed a free citizen.”). Pennsylvania jettisoned this provision in
1790, although it included a clause guaranteeing “[t]hat all men are born equally free and inde-
pendent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of . . . acquir-
ing, possessing, and protecting property.” PENN. CONST. OF 1790, art. 9, § 1, reprinted in THE
AMERICAN’S GUIDE 135 (Hogan & Thompson, 1835). North Carolina removed the provision
guaranteeing alien land rights in 1868. See N.C. CONST. OF 1868.
185. See KENT, supra note 33, at 55–56.
186. See KEYSSAR, supra note 24, at 27–28.
187. See WIS. CONVENTION OF 1846, supra note 59, at 259–60.
188. Id. at 261.
189. See, e.g., WIS. CONVENTION OF 1847, supra note 31, at 94, 95 (noting that these were
“mere legislative details, having no appropriate place in the constitution”).
190. Id. at 126.
191. See infra notes 205, 206 and accompanying text, Part II.C.
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purchased property during the territorial period and were not yet natural-
ized citizens.
C. Protecting Property
By rejecting strictures on voting and property-holding in federal ter-
ritorial law, Congress facilitated the growth of an enfranchised, propertied
immigrant population in the West. The presence of land-owning, en-
franchised noncitizens within the territories influenced the constitutional
debates in those states that adopted immigrant-friendly provisions. Con-
ventions in each state included delegates of foreign birth.192 Native-born
delegates were aware and tried to be responsive to their immigrant constit-
uents.193 This turned the conversation into one about protecting vested
interests in property, rather than one focused solely on attracting prospec-
tive migrants.
The first provision protecting alien property rights to be successfully
introduced in a nineteenth-century constitution was the outcome of a mo-
tion by a German-born naturalized citizen and delegate to the Iowa con-
stitutional convention of 1844 named Henry M. Salmon.194 Salmon had
arrived via steamboat up the Missouri River in Fort Madison, Iowa, with
his wife on August 6, 1836—less than ten years prior to the constitutional
convention.195 He opened the territory’s first drug store, called the “Good
Samaritan,” shortly thereafter.196 Salmon introduced the provision grant-
192. The California Convention of 48 delegates included seven native Californios, born in
the region before American occupation, and five delegates born in Europe. JOHNSON, supra note
166, at 104–05. The Wisconsin Convention of 1846 included thirteen foreign-born delegates
and at least eight first-generation immigrants, out of 124 total delegates. WIS. CONVENTION OF
1846, supra note 59, at 756–800. The Michigan delegation of one hundred included eight for-
eign-born delegates. MICHIGAN DEBATES, supra note 152, at v–vi. The Iowa Convention of
1844 included only three foreign-born delegates, out of a total of seventy-two, but two of these
were particularly influential in the debates: German-born delegate Henry Salmon introduced the
provision guaranteeing noncitizen property ownership, and Irish-born delegate Michael O’Brien
introduced the provision supporting alien suffrage. FRAGMENTS OF THE IOWA CONVENTIONS,
supra note 152, at 408–10.
193. See, e.g., WIS. CONVENTION OF 1847, supra note 31, at 172 (comments of Mr. Lakin)
(“We hear members of this convention threatening to vote down the constitution, unless we
make provision for the foreign vote. They say that their constituents are principally foreigners,
and that they are all-powerful.”). Lakin opposed alien suffrage but noted that “[a] large portion
of those whom I have the honor, in part, to represent, are foreigners—English, Irish, German,
and others, from various parts of the world.” Id.
194. THE HISTORY OF LEE COUNTY, IOWA 392 (Chicago, Western Historical Co. 1879).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 292. Salmon ran this business until he died in 1873; his son, J.F. Salmon, then
took it over. Records indicate that Salmon was a well-respected member of the community. His
home was one of three used for township elections in 1842 and he served as chairman of the
county board of supervisors in the 1860s. He was a charter member and officer of the Concordia
Lodge in 1861. Id. at 392, 547, 564, 597, 611. One contemporary reminisced that Salmon “had
a monopoly of selling whisky for the thirsty and the traveling men”; this reputation likely con-
tributed to his general popularity. Id. at 666.
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ing property rights to noncitizens on the seventh day of the Iowa constitu-
tional convention, when the delegates were discussing a draft of the Bill of
Rights. Salmon proposed adding a clause stating that “[f]oreigners who
are residents of this state, shall enjoy the same rights in respect to the pos-
session, enjoyment and descent of property, as native citizens of the United
States.”197 The proposition was “unanimously agreed to.”198
There are many fascinating questions about this episode, the answers
to which have likely been lost to history. Why did Salmon introduce the
provision? Had he experienced difficulties in acquiring and transferring
property? Were there others in Lee County who had encouraged him to
propose such a provision? Was he influenced by extant provisions? And
why did the delegates vote in favor of the clause? Such unanimity was not
present in the states to follow; in Wisconsin and California there were at
least some expressions of doubt or concern about alien land rights, and the
votes were not unanimous.199 While we cannot know with certainty the
answers to these questions, we can make some general observations drawn
from the regional history and other parts of the debates that help explain
this important constitutional event. Salmon may not have suffered alien
property disabilities, given the federal law in force in the territory. How-
ever, he was likely sensitive to land rights given the history of land tenure
in Germany. As historian Mark Wyman notes, many Irish and German
migrants had struggled in their home countries with finding and holding
onto land. Farmers in those countries “had been forced onto smaller and
smaller landholdings that by the 1840s were being taken away by wealthy
landlords.”200 Land was central to the decision of many emigrants to leave
their home countries, so it is not surprising that land rights were a concern
upon their arrival in the United States.
Salmon’s amendment resonated beyond Iowa’s boundaries. The
committee to draft a Bill of Rights for the California Convention looked
to two other states’ constitutions for guidance: New York’s and Iowa’s.201
California’s property provision, along with twelve other provisions, was
lifted directly from the Iowa constitution, according to the chair of the Bill
of Rights committee.202 California delegates did try to make some
changes; a suggestion to include the word “permanent” before the word
197. FRAGMENTS OF THE IOWA CONVENTIONS, supra note 152, at 41. Salmon himself was
not on the committee to draft the bill of rights, but instead on the State Boundaries committee.
Id. at 9.
198. Id. at 41.
199. See CALIFORNIA DEBATES, supra note 152, at 43; WIS. CONVENTION OF 1847, supra
note 31, at 127.
200. MARK WYMAN, IMMIGRANTS IN THE VALLEY: IRISH, GERMANS, AND AMERICANS
IN THE UPPER MISSISSIPPI COUNTRY, 1830–1860, at 70–71 (1984).
201. CALIFORNIA DEBATES, supra note 152, at 31.
202. Id. (noting that “the first eight sections [of the draft Bill of Rights] . . . were from the
Constitution of New York; all the others were from the Constitution of Iowa”).
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“resident” was rejected, but one to include “bona fide” before “resident”
succeeded.203 Two delegates tried to eviscerate the provision; one sought
to replace the word resident with the word “citizen,” which would have
undermined the entire premise, and another proposed to strike the provi-
sion all together. However, this suggestion was overruled in a vote of
twenty-five to eleven.204 California thereafter adopted the Iowa clause al-
most verbatim, adding the minor requirement that noncitizens be “bona
fide” residents of the state.205
The California debates also leave unanswered questions, since there
was little recorded discussion of the provision besides the various amend-
ments to change the wording.206 There was no clear contribution here
from a delegate of foreign birth, as there was in Iowa, but we do know that
a fair portion of the overall delegation in California were either of foreign
birth or had been born in Alta California while it was still a part of Mex-
ico. Of the forty-eight delegates, seven were native Californios—those who
had been born in California prior to American occupation—and five had
been born in Europe.207 The remainder hailed from states in the East. The
committee that first introduced the draft Bill of Rights was comprised of
twenty delegates, five of whom were native Californios.208 The significant
number of delegates of Mexican and European birth may have influenced
the ultimate adoption of the foreign property rights provision.
Another, perhaps concurrent, explanation for the adoption of this
provision is California’s treaty obligation. Protection of noncitizen prop-
erty was a treaty requirement after the U.S.-Mexico War. Articles VIII and
IX of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo protected property holdings of
Mexican citizens within the new territory.209 Delegates of Mexican de-
203. Id. at 43.
204. Id.
205. Compare id. with FRAGMENTS OF THE IOWA CONVENTIONS, supra note 152, at 41.
206. The provision was likely discussed in committee, but committee debates were not
included in the official record.
207. JOHNSON, supra note 166, at 104–05. European delegates had emigrated from five
different countries: Spain, Scotland, Switzerland, Ireland, and France. Id.
208. See CALIFORNIA DEBATES, supra note 152.
209. See Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 168. Article VIII states, in part:
Mexicans now established in territories previously belonging to Mexico, and
which remain for the future within the limits of the United States, as defined by
the present treaty, shall be free to continue where they now reside, or to remove at
any time to the Mexican Republic, retaining the property which they possess in
the said territories, or disposing thereof, and removing the proceeds wherever they
please; without their being subjected, on this account, to any contribution, tax, or
charge whatever. . . . In the said territories, property of every kind, now belong-
ing to Mexicans, not established there, shall be inviolably respected. The present
owners, the heirs of these, and all Mexicans who may hereafter acquire said prop-
erty by contract, shall enjoy with respect to it, guaranties [sic] equally ample as if
the same belonged to citizens of the United States.
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scent, along with others, reminded the convention of these treaty require-
ments with regard to suffrage;210 it is not unrealistic to think that they did
so with regard to property rights as well.
Wisconsin’s two conventions were also both comprised of fair num-
bers of foreign-born delegates.211 In 1848, the successful provision—and
the first to depart in wording from Iowa’s precedent—was introduced by
Morritz Schoeffler, a delegate from Milwaukee County.212 Schoeffler was
born in Germany in 1813 and traveled to the U.S. in 1842. He arrived in
Wisconsin in 1844.213 A prominent member of the Milwaukee commu-
nity, Schoeffler published the first German-language paper in the state and
served as school commissioner and register of deeds.214 As an immigrant
and a delegate from a heavily-immigrant county, Schoeffler was commit-
ted to protecting the rights of noncitizens. In addition to promoting alien
property rights, he also argued forcefully for the continuation of alien suf-
frage.215 His provision––introduced as an amendment to the committee
report––passed by a vote of 43 to 18.216
Id. Article IX states:
The Mexicans who, in the territories aforesaid, shall not preserve the character of
citizens of the Mexican Republic, conformably with what is stipulated in the pre-
ceding article, shall be incorporated into the Union of the United States. and be
admitted at the proper time (to be judged of by the Congress of the United States)
to the enjoyment of all the rights of citizens of the United States according to the
principles of the Constitution; and in the mean time, shall be maintained and
protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty and property, and secured in the
free exercise of their religion without restriction.
Id.
210. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA DEBATES, supra note 152, at 63.
211. See sources cited supra note 192.
212. WIS. CONVENTION OF 1847, supra note 31, at 127. Schoeffler’s provision, later
adopted, stated that “[n]o distinction shall ever be made by law between resident aliens and
citizens, in reference to the possession, enjoyment, or descent of property.” Id. Delegates pre-
ferred this wording to an alternate version, introduced by the committee, which would have
restricted rights to those who had declared their intent to naturalize. See id. This version also
allowed that “property of foreigners who may die within three years after their arrival in this
state, or in the United States, and without such declaration of intention, shall not escheat to the
state or United States.” Id. Schoeffler’s amendment was a significant simplification since it re-
moved escheat proceedings for all resident foreigners.
213. Schoeffler, Moritz, in CLIFFORD NEAL SMITH, EARLY-NINETEENTH CENTURY GER-
MAN SETTLERS IN OHIO (MAINLY CINCINNATI AND OTHER ENVIRONS), KENTUCKY AND
OTHER STATES 37 (1984).
214. Moritz Schoeffler, 1813–1875, WISCONSINHISTORY.ORG, http://www.wisconsinhis-
tory.org/dictionary/index.asp?action=view&term_id=2597&term_type_id=1&term_type_
text=people&letter=S (last visited Nov.12, 2013).
215. See, e.g., WIS. CONVENTION OF 1847, supra note 31, at 93, 190.
216. Id. at 127.
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As in California, there was little direct discussion of alien property
rights in the debates surrounding Michigan’s constitution of 1850. The
convention to revise the 1835 constitution consisted of one hundred dele-
gates, eight of whom were born outside the United States: one each from
England, Ireland, and Scotland, and five from Canada.217 The vast major-
ity were born in New York or one of the New England states. We have no
direct evidence that these foreign-born delegates had a direct impact on
the adoption of the constitutional provision; there was no specific vote on
this clause in particular. It is interesting to note, however, that all eight of
the foreign-born delegates hailed from countries with British legal tradi-
tions, and that three of the delegates were lawyers.218 We can surmise that
these British-born migrants were aware of English land policies and the
American alternatives. Thus foreign-born delegates may have had an influ-
ence on the provision adopted in Michigan as well.
While delegates were certainly interested in attracting new immi-
grants to their state, the property provisions were also the product of a
desire to protect vested interests in property. As Wisconsin delegate
George Gale remarked, to refrain from offering such protection in the
constitution would be an “extreme injustice,” since “[t]he organic act and
the present laws of Wisconsin, had held out the inducement to foreigners
to possess, enjoy, and transmit real estate . . . .”219 Another delegate, Mr.
Judd, noted that “[f]oreigners are, and will continue to be daily buying
and selling lands,” and that he had “personally witnessed forty such trans-
fers within the six months past.” Judd continued, “If now, it was to be
declared that only those who had already become citizens, should hold
their lands, the effect would be to rip up, nullify, and destroy all contracts
of this kind.” If foreigners who had relied on the prospect of land owner-
ship when deciding to move to the state were unfairly barred by the impo-
sition of the common law, the effect, Judd argued, “would be in the
highest degree disastrous . . . .”220
Delegates also made clear that failing to include property rights in the
constitution—or restricting them by citizenship—would not just affect fu-
ture migrants, but would also work an injustice on current noncitizen re-
sidents. Here, delegates used territorial law to argue on moral as well as
legal grounds. A proposed limitation on such rights, as several delegates
noted, was not “in accordance with the laws of the United States.”221 An-
other delegate noted that such a limitation would be “opposed to the ordi-
nance and laws of congress.”222 A provision guaranteeing property rights
217. MICHIGAN DEBATES, supra note 152, at v–vi.
218. Id.
219. WIS. CONVENTION OF 1847, supra note 31, at 94.
220. Id. at 95.
221. Id. at 93.
222. Id. at 94.
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to resident aliens, on the other hand, “was just what the laws of the United
States conferred upon them.”223 Delegates thus argued that ensuring alien
property rights was a necessary and just continuation of extant practices,
required either under federal land law or, in the case of California, the
treaty signed with Mexico.
The presence of an active and enfranchised alien population was thus
one of the most important preconditions for the passage of these immi-
grant-friendly constitutional provisions. Salmon, Schoeffler and other for-
eign-born delegates—including both noncitizens and naturalized
citizens—ensured that their own property rights, as well as the property
rights of their noncitizen constituents, would be protected. And in doing
so, they also set the stage for active recruitment of immigrants in the
future.
D. Attracting Migrants, Redefining Membership
The pragmatic, instrumental goal of constitutionalizing alien land
rights was attracting migrants. Convention debates evidence an apprecia-
tion for the role of migration in both the past and the future of the polity.
As one Wisconsin delegate (dramatically) phrased it: “Wisconsin owes all
to emigration—foreign emigration—even to her very existence today as a
civilized state. And shall we resist our destiny, or foster it?”224
Western governments competed actively for European migrants im-
mediately after achieving statehood by creating state commissions to re-
cruit immigrants. Commissioners opened offices in New York and traveled
throughout Europe advertising their states. Wisconsin was the first to cre-
ate a state-run “commission of emigration,” but it was followed shortly
thereafter by many others—Michigan, Iowa, and Arkansas among them.225
States published manuals for migrants in multiple languages, touting the
advantages of their particular climates, resources, and land laws.226 Mi-
grants themselves published manuals of advice to other emigrants, giving
advice and weighing the strengths and weaknesses of the various western
states.227 State constitutional provisions that removed noncitizen property
223. Id. at 107.
224. WIS. CONVENTION OF 1846, supra note 59, at 264.
225. Theodore C. Blegen, The Competition of the Northwestern States for Immigrants, 3 WIS.
MAG. OF HIST. 3, 4 (1919); Beverly Watkins, Efforts to Encourage Immigration to Arkansas,
1865–1874, 38 ARK. HIST. QUAR. 32, 37–61 (1979).
226. Blegen, supra note 225, at 4, 13–18 (noting that states in the Midwest “carried on
comprehensive and ingenious campaigns” to attract migrants, including the publication of state
pamphlets).
227. See, e.g., CARL DE HAAS, HINTS FOR IMMIGRANTS (Julius Ba¨decker Verlag et al. eds.,
1848); SAMUEL FREEMAN, THE EMIGRANT’S HANDBOOK AND GUIDE TO THE STATE OF WIS-
CONSIN (1851); MARK WYMAN, IMMIGRANTS IN THE VALLEY: IRISH, GERMANS AND AMERI-
CANS IN THE UPPER MISSISSIPPI COUNTRY, 1830–1860, at 71 (1984) (“By 1840 several
thousand Irish and Germans had gone to America. Many of them wrote travel books for the
home market, and all formed a new base or haven for the next traveler.”).
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disabilities were one additional measure to attract settlers, for they signaled
to migrants the desirability and inclusivity of the state. Property law be-
came a new tool in the state competition over immigrants.
Some commentators at the time interpreted these provisions as
merely instrumental measures. The Chicago Daily Tribune, in an article crit-
ical of Iowa’s constitutional provision, opined in 1886 that “[t]he laws
granting special privileges to aliens were adopted in the Western
States . . . when the population was sparse, land plenty, and everybody
[was] anxious to adopt any measure that would ‘bring money into the
country.’”228
To reduce the constitutional property provisions to utilitarian interest
alone, however, missed their broader significance. Some delegates con-
ceived of the extension of property rights to noncitizens as an expression
of a more inclusive ideology of membership in the American polity. In
their estimation, one did not have to be a citizen to have a place in the
community. Foreigners, even those who had not officially declared their
allegiance to the United States, could contribute economically and politi-
cally to the polity. Extending property rights to foreigners was thus a rec-
ognition of their belonging. Sometimes delegates made both instrumental
and ideological arguments in a single breath: delegate Beall remarked in
the 1847 Wisconsin debates that a proposed section limiting property
rights to naturalized citizens “would be depriving foreigners of the most
essential privilege that freemen could enjoy, and,” he hastened to add,
would “operate as a severe check upon immigration.”229
Delegates agreed, for the most part, on the need to attract migrants
to the state, but they were not always in agreement on the proper means of
doing so. A vocal minority in Wisconsin preferred to keep property rights
restricted to those who had declared an intent to naturalize. The delegate
who drafted this provision was himself an immigrant. James De Noon
Reymert migrated to the United States from Norway in 1842. He arrived
in Wisconsin in 1844, just three years before the second constitutional
convention to which he was elected delegate. Reymert published the first
Norwegian newspaper in the country and was an active proponent of emi-
gration from Europe.230 His proposed provision limiting property rights to
those who had declared their intent to naturalize was not rooted in a nati-
vist impulse. Instead, according to the debates, Reymert had protectionist
concerns. A fellow member of Reymert’s committee described his ratio-
nale this way: migrants “have every inducement held out to them to come
here—but none whatever to become citizens.”231 Their proposal was de-
228. Alien Landlordism in Iowa, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Feb. 13, 1886, at 4.
229. WIS. CONVENTION OF 1847, supra note 31, at 92.
230. DICTIONARY OF WISCONSIN HISTORY, http://www.wisconsinhistory.org (search
“James DeNoon Reymert”).
231. WIS. CONVENTION OF 1847, supra note 31, at 93 (comments of Mr. Sanders).
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signed, he noted, “especially for their own benefit—to make them re-
nounce their allegiance to the country from which they came, and to take
the oath of allegiance to our own government. In a word, to Americanize
them, and make them citizens.”232 Requiring a declaration of intent first
was “an act of charity,” argued another delegate, one that would rightly
“compel foreigners to become citizens.”233
The proposal to limit property rights to those who had declared their
intent to remain in the state thus struck off a more nuanced conversation
about how best to attract migrants: was it better to reserve full property
rights to declaring immigrants and thereby encourage all immigrants to
naturalize as soon as possible? Or was it preferable to grant land rights to all
immigrants regardless of their intent to naturalize? This was a reprise of the
debates in Congress over the 1790 Naturalization Act. Some favored re-
stricting land rights in order to encourage naturalization, while others fa-
vored expanding land rights in order to encourage settlement. Both camps
assumed the desired outcome was the eventual full incorporation of these
migrants into the American polity. Those opposed to Reymert’s provision
limiting property rights to declarant noncitizens stressed the legal havoc it
might wreak on both current and prospective noncitizen landholders. One
delegate appealed directly to Reymert’s constituents: “Was [Reymert]
willing,” Mr. Gale asked, “that if a Norwegian should come with a nu-
merous family and invest his all in a quarter section of land, and should
then die, that that land should revert to the state of Wisconsin, and his
children thrown upon the world, without a dollar to assist them . . . ?”234
In the end, none of the first four adopters of constitutional property
rights for noncitizens made property rights dependent on the filing of a
declaration of intent to naturalize. Delegates in these states opted for a
more expansive view of membership. Immigrants did not have to be natu-
ralized citizens, or to declare their intent to naturalize, in order to contrib-
ute economically and to participate politically. The move to
constitutionalize noncitizen property rights thus grew out of an instru-
mental need for settlers as well as a more expansive view of foreign mem-
bership in the polity.
E. Modernizing Property Law
Arguments for the extension of property rights to noncitizens were
accompanied by assertions of a specifically “American” vision of property
law, one that was rooted in equality rather than “monarchy, aristocracy, or
monopoly.”235 Delegates who were in favor of noncitizen property rights
focused on the ways these provisions would be in line with, as one delegate
232. Id.
233. Id. at 95 (comments of Mr. Doran).
234. Id. at 94 (comments of Mr. Gale).
235. FRAGMENTS OF THE IOWA CONVENTIONS, supra note 152, at 331.
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called it, “the liberal and enlightened policy of the age.”236 A Wisconsin
delegate and Irish immigrant, Daniel Harkin, asked and answered his own
rhetorical question: “Ques. What constitutes the keystone in the arch of
our liberty? Ans. The right of soil vested in the occupant.”237 What made
the U.S. different from Europe, Harkin argued, was both its republican
political system and its distinctive property law: “[H]ere . . . we have no
kings, no counts, no ecclesiastical dominion; the poor man is not humbled
by paying feudal service to a lord, nor harassed by tithes or game laws. No,
sir, they are the owners of the soil they till.”238 Harkin, then, was one of
many who made the connection between liberty, property, and state
progress.
Delegates envisioned themselves getting rid of feudal relics, including
the alien land laws.239 A textual analysis of these constitutions reveals a
common anti-feudal theme. For example, Wisconsin’s Constitution of
1848 included a section, immediately preceding the alien property clause,
stating that “all lands within the state are declared to be allodial, and feudal
tenures are prohibited.”240 This statement was followed by a provision out-
lawing imprisonment for debt, which delegates considered a particularly
distasteful relic of the feudal system. Similarly, Michigan’s Constitution of
1850 included a provision, also immediately preceding the alien land
clause, outlawing long-term in-kind agricultural leases, which were per-
ceived as creating a feudal obligation.241
In public opinion and legal treatises alike, these changes often took
the form of continued critiques of England and the “Old World.” Dele-
gates staked their claims on uniquely “American” notions of property and
liberty.242 A Chicago paper, for example, criticized the lack of alien rights
236. JOURNAL OF THE WIS. CONVENTION, supra note 189, at 93.
237. THE CONVENTION OF 1864, supra note 59, at 250. Harkin was born in Ireland in
1799 and was one of the early settlers of Kenosha County. Id. at 775.
238. Id. at 249.
239. See JACK STARK, THE IOWA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE (1998)
(noting that this “rather anachronistic aversion to feudalism . . . appeared in several state constitu-
tions of the vintage of Iowa’s”).
240. WIS. CONST. OF 1848 art. 1, § 14. Most antebellum conventions were a mix of law-
yers and farmers. At times, the legal terminology was aggravating to those not as schooled in the
law; as one reporter remarked during the Wisconsin debates of 1846: “[A]fter the explana-
tion . . . that the word ‘allodial’ meant ‘my own’ and that if a man possessing an estate died
without heirs, his estate did ‘escheat’ to the state––after that explanation––I came to the conclu-
sion that my land is my own unless I get cheated out of it, and if I died without heirs it will go to
the attorney general.” WIS. CONVENTION OF 1846, supra note 59, at 518.
241. MICH. CONST. OF 1850, art. 18 §, 12 (“No lease or grant hereafter of agricultural
land for a longer period than twelve years, reserving any rent or service of any kind, shall be
valid.”); see also WIS. CONST. OF 1848 art. 1 §, 14 (also prohibiting long-term in-kind agricul-
tural leases).
242. See, e.g., MICH. DEBATES, supra note 152, at 642 (comparing the “inalienable rights”
of “American citizens” with the “feudal despotism” of England); WIS. CONVENTION OF 1846,
supra note 59, at 631 (declaring the doctrine of coverture to be “a remnant of the feudal system,
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in England and drew parallels between the treatment of aliens and citizens
there. “It is true that England treats the majority of her own subjects,
through her laws of primogeniture and entail, almost as harshly as aliens,”
the article asserted; English property laws were “a disgrace in a country
claiming to be civilized” and would “drive[ ] England to a new
revolution.”243
In these states, residents were catching the wave of property reform
instigated during the Revolution; feudal relics, they hoped, would no
longer bind the rights of property holders. This attitude comports well
with the philosophy of Jacksonian democracy, which privileged the ex-
pansive rights of White men (and sometimes women), regardless of their
place of birth. As historian David Alen Johnson writes, “Central to ante-
bellum America’s rhetoric of popular democracy was a correlation be-
tween liberty and individual freedom in a market economy.”244
Property, in this view, had the power to both attract and educate
immigrants. Delegates placed faith in the power of property to American-
ize oppressed peoples from the “Old World.” Property ownership itself
would be a key first lesson. This was an argument noted in congressional
debates over the 1852 Homestead Act: “As soon as he finds himself in
possession of a home of his own, and occupying a position that makes him
a free man . . . he will and must feel proud of American citizenship. He
becomes identified with us in hopes, in interest, in feeling.”245
The vision that emerged from the debates on noncitizen property
laws emphasized both the liberative power of property—that is, property’s
power to free White men from tyranny and oppression—and its essential
role in economic development. Here were both proprietary and commod-
ity views of property, to use Gregory Alexander’s terms.246 Granting
noncitizens property rights would lead to a better, more democratic soci-
ety, while also abandoning strictures that would prevent the easy market
alienability of property.
The effort to include alien property rights in antebellum constitu-
tions comprised both a rejection of feudalism and an embrace of a different
stance towards property, one that saw widespread property ownership, free
of state interference or dependence, as essential to the democratic project.
which ought to be abolished, and the sooner the better”); id. at 277 (contrasting the “tyranny”
and “aristocracy” of England and Europe with “America . . . the land where the ‘blessings of
government, like the dews of heaven, descend alike upon the rich and the poor’”).
243. Rights of Aliens in England, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 29, 1868, at 2. Ironically, it was England,
not the United States, that abandoned all strictures on alien property rights, just two years after
this article was published, in the Naturalization Act of 1870. See discussion supra Part II.D.
244. JOHNSON, supra note 166, at 121.
245. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1672 (1860) (comments of Rep. Cyrus L. Dun-
ham of Indiana).
246. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY, supra note 24, at 1–2 (defining the
“commodity” and “propriety” views of property).
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Yet this was a limited liberative vision. As the following Part explains, the
goal was not to attract any and all settlers, but rather a particular kind of
settler, namely White Europeans.
III. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION
The vision of widespread, democratic property ownership did not
extend to certain potential landowners in these fledgling states, namely free
Blacks and Native Americans. The extension of property rights was con-
tingent upon certain assumptions about the origin, race, and location of
the property owners. These assumptions become clear when we look to
concurrent constitutional convention debates over Black migration, uni-
versal suffrage, and the influence of foreign corporations.
Examining concurrent debates also helps illuminate the relationship
between property, citizenship, and race. The separation of civil rights from
citizenship cut both ways: it enabled some foreigners to enjoy certain
rights without attaining formal citizenship, while at the same time ena-
bling denial of the rights of others. In this way, the choice to disconnect
rights from citizenship—that is, to make rights of property and suffrage
not dependent on citizenship status—was both inclusive and exclusive,
benefitting foreigners and harming citizens of color.247
This section first describes delegates’ efforts in the states that adopted
noncitizen property rights to prohibit or discourage the migration of
Blacks. It then explores the role of race in the debates about the relation-
ship between property and suffrage. Finally, it describes the explicit limita-
tions within the constitutional provisions (which granted rights to
“resident” aliens only) and the underlying fear of foreign corporate influ-
ence. The racialized assumptions in the debates and the specific legal ex-
clusions of the constitutional provisions help explain the persistence of
alien land restrictions in the twentieth century, which will be the subject
of Part IV.
A. Black Migration
The urge to attract European migrants had an undercurrent: the fear
of some delegates that immigrant-friendly policies would attract free
Blacks. Delegates in Iowa, California, and Michigan considered provisions
that would have outlawed the migration of free Blacks to those states. They
were in good company: territories throughout the West passed, or consid-
ered passing, restrictive “Black laws” during the antebellum era.248 During
the California convention, delegates introduced and debated a provision
that would have “prohibit[ed] free persons of color from immigrating to
247. African Americans were, in Mae Ngai’s terminology, “alien citizens,” treated as out-
siders despite their formal right of territorial membership. See Mae M. Ngai, Birthright Citizen-
ship and the Alien Citizen, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2521 (2007).
248. See generally BERWANGER, supra note 27.
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and settling in this state.”249 The proposal failed, but not because of lack of
popular support; rather, delegates feared that Congress would not grant
statehood if such a provision were in the state constitution.250 California
delegates did succeed in limiting suffrage to “white males,” with the ex-
press intent of preventing persons of color—Blacks and Indians—from
voting.251
During the Iowa convention of 1844, a provision that would have
obligated the state legislature “to pass laws to exclude from the state blacks
and mulattoes” failed by only three votes.252 Proponents of the measure
argued that Iowa would be “overrun” by the “broken-down negroes of
Missouri,” a neighboring slave state. Representative Baily remarked that
his constituents “did not want negroes swarming among them.”253 The
provision failed, as it did in California, because of fears that Congress
would not approve a constitution containing such a clause. Those voting
against the exclusionary provision could rest assured, said one delegate,
that the legislature “would undoubtedly take measures to that effect” after
Iowa became a state.254 The territorial legislature of Iowa had already done
so in 1838, when it passed a law that required free Blacks to post bond
upon their entrance to the state and to possess a “certificate of free-
dom.”255 The new state legislature would do so in 1851, after the constitu-
tion’s adoption.256 Delegates kept such language out of the constitution
out of concerns for attaining statehood, but knew that their own state—as
well as many others in the West—had already prohibited movement via
statutory law.257
Delegates viewed the extension of civil rights to free Blacks as a dan-
gerous inducement to their migration. In Michigan, for example, Repre-
sentative Britain argued that extending civic privileges like suffrage would
cause Michigan to be “overwhelmed with colored persons from the
249. CALIFORNIA DEBATES, supra note 152, at 48.
250. See id. at 337–38; see also JOHNSON, supra note 166, at 129.
251. CALIFORNIA DEBATES, supra note 152, at 341 (recording the successful amendment
“inserting the word ‘white’ before ‘males’ and striking out the words ‘Indians, Africans, and
descendants of Africans’”).
252. FRAGMENTS OF THE IOWA CONVENTIONS, supra note 152, at 156.
253. Id. at 155.
254. Id. at 156.
255. BERWANGER, supra note 27, at 32.
256. Id. at 43.
257. Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois all considered prohibitions on the migration of free Blacks
in their constitutional conventions earlier in the century. All three eventually adopted statutory
restrictions on movement in the 1830s. Restrictions throughout the region in this era extended
both to movement (requiring free Blacks to have certificates of freedom and post bond upon
entrance to the state), as well as to civil rights (excluding Blacks from the franchise, militia
service, and courtrooms). See BERWANGER, supra note 27, at 30–51. On Ohio, see Paul
Finkelman, The Strange Career of Race Discrimination in Antebellum Ohio, 55 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 373, 382–89 (2004).
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south,” and that delegates should take up a policy generally to “discourage
the settlement of colored people in our State.”258 Delegate Leach, who
was in favor of Black suffrage, parodied the concern for migration:
“Thousands there are who raise their hands in holy horror at the thought
that it will fill our state with negroes. ‘We shall be flooded with them,’ says
the objector. ‘They will come upon us in swarms, like locusts of Egypt,
until the land will be darkened’.”259 (Leach then proceeded to provide
population statistics for those states with race-neutral suffrage, demonstrat-
ing no such “flood” had ever occurred.)260
No constitutional provisions were introduced in these four states that
explicitly or directly limited Black citizen landholding. However, one pro-
vision recommended by a delegate in the Wisconsin Convention of 1846
may have been calculated to achieve this end. The provision would have
limited land rights to those who were eligible to become citizens.261 The
naturalization law at that time allowed only free White persons to natural-
ize, and there were ongoing debates about whether freed slaves were legal
citizens,262 though Dred Scott v. Sanford temporarily settled this debate.263
Such a provision, if it had been adopted, would have limited land owner-
ship by race.264
The extension of land rights to noncitizens was portrayed by some as
an important bulwark against the encroachment of “uncivilized” persons
in the state. The specter of “amalgamation” appeared repeatedly, as those
opposed to Black migration into the state painted a picture of interracial
marriage and social intermingling.265 An influx of foreigners, on the other
hand, did not worry the delegates in this way; as one argued, “the foreign-
ers will eventually be with us one people, and we should grant them the
privileges asked.”266 Michigan Representative Britain’s support for civil
rights for foreigners and disdain for extending similar rights to Blacks was
premised on the same conclusion: “Encourage them, and they will come
258. MICHIGAN DEBATES, supra note 152, at 294–95.
259. Id. at 288–89.
260. Id.
261. See WIS. CONVENTION OF 1846, supra note 58, at 213.
262. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA DEBATES, supra note 152, at 331 (comments of Mr. McCarver)
(“It has been contended by my friend here (Mr. Norton), that negroes are citizens; that a resi-
dent is a citizen, and consequently entitled to all the rights and privileges here enjoyed by citizens
of the States generally. Now, we all know how this matter stands there; we are well aware that
negroes are not regarded as citizens.”).
263. See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 427 (1856).
264. It was, as it turns out, a foreshadowing of the anti-Asian land laws, which prohibited
those “ineligible for naturalization”—at that time, a category that included all those of Asian
nationality—from leasing or owning property. See Tirres, supra note 1, at 94–96, 101–07.
265. See, e.g., WIS. CONVENTION OF 1846, supra note 59, at 214 (arguing that “[i]t was
not right to mingle together two races whom God had declared could not mingle”).
266. MICHIGAN DEBATES, supra note 152, at 492; see also WIS. CONVENTION OF 1846,
supra note 59, at 235 (noting with favor the “amalgamation” of “different national elements”).
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amongst us.”267 Encouraging foreign migration would not only boost the
state’s settled population, it would also leave less room for unwanted Black
migrants. In this sense, property reforms were, in legal scholar Kunal
Parker’s words, “making blacks foreigners” while simultaneously making
foreigners American.268
B. Property and Suffrage
Granting property rights for foreigners in state constitutions signaled
widespread acceptance of the disassociation of civil rights and citizenship:
one did not have to be a citizen to have rights of ownership.269 In conven-
tion debates, delegates repeatedly expounded a vision involving gradations
of membership, which would allow the extension of rights to aliens. This
perspective on citizenship—that it was separate from rights—was essen-
tially inclusive, since it opened up rights of landholding to foreigners, ena-
bling them to participate in the economic development of the country and
to establish a foothold in their communities. This theme of inclusiveness
would reappear in a different form decades later, when the Supreme Court
ruled in Yick Wo v. Hopkins that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to
noncitizens.270 As Justice Matthews stated in that case, “[the] provisions
[of the Fourteenth Amendment] are universal in their application to all
persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differ-
ences of race, of color, or of nationality, and the equal protection of the
laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.”271
One of the arguments that delegates had to rebut when seeking to
constitutionalize noncitizen property rights was that land rights and suf-
frage were necessarily connected. Owning property, paying taxes, and vot-
ing had been tied together in the republican imagination since the
Revolutionary era. Delegates in Wisconsin had to be convinced that sepa-
rating land ownership and taxation from voting was acceptable. Some ar-
gued for delaying taxation until suffrage was granted; Representative Leach
argued during the 1850 Michigan debates that “as long as you deny the
right of voting to a whole class [of foreigners], you should exempt their
property [from taxation].”272 Most disagreed with Leach, arguing that it
was possible to disassociate property ownership and voting rights. This dis-
267. MICHIGAN DEBATES, supra note 152, at 256.
268. Parker, supra note 27, at 81.
269. The converse was true as well in the nineteenth century: that those who were citizens
did not have to have civil rights. See Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (ruling that a married
women, though a citizen, could be prevented from admission to the state bar based on gender);
see also Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 177 (1874) (holding that “the Constitution, when it
conferred citizenship, did not necessarily confer the right of suffrage” and upholding Missouri’s
law limiting suffrage to males).
270. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
271. Id. at 369.
272. MICHIGAN DEBATES, supra note 152, at 851.
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association was in accord with retreats from property qualifications for the
vote generally.273
Proponents of alien suffrage argued that voting itself should be sepa-
rate from citizenship. As Representative Ryan insisted in the Wisconsin
debates of 1846, “suffrage is not citizenship, nor citizenship suffrage.”274
Some commentators saw a unifying principle in extending the right to
vote to all “inhabitants,” whether foreign-born or Black. Others preferred
to grant the vote discriminately, to those who merited the right. “In re-
gard to negro suffrage, I am in favor of withholding the elective franchise
from the colored man for the same reason I would confer it upon the
foreign population,” stated W.H. Clark in the Wisconsin debates.275 To
Clark, the franchise should be given only to those who were capable of
feeling a strong and lasting attachment to the country. Those of the “Afri-
can race” were unable to do so, he argued, whereas migrants—even rela-
tively recent ones—had demonstrated appropriate attachment. Wisconsin
supported such a bifurcation in the Constitution of 1846, which restricted
voting rights to “white citizens” and “white persons, not citizens of the
United States,” who had declared their intent to apply for naturalization
and had taken an oath of allegiance.276 Notably, the Wisconsin Constitu-
tion of 1847, which was ratified by the people, removed the racial restric-
tion; it provided suffrage for all male citizens and for White male foreigners
who had declared an intent to naturalize. The debates reveal that the aboli-
tionist vote may have played a large role. In fact, some blamed the failure
of the ratification of the 1846 Constitution on abolitionists who refused to
vote for a document that did not provide race-neutral suffrage.277 In Wis-
consin, then, anti-slavery sentiment benefitted both foreigners and Blacks.
Arguments about suffrage were inextricably linked with arguments
about property. In California, for example, delegates argued against suf-
frage for free Blacks or Indians on the basis of their inability to support
themselves. Free Blacks, according to the convention’s president, were a
threat because they “have never been freemen; [they] have never been
273. Delegates expressed disdain for property qualifications. See, e.g., WIS. CONVENTION
OF 1846, supra note 59, at 245 (comments of Rep. Burchard) (“[A] property qualification is an
old and exploded doctrine.”).
274. Id. at 259. This argument would also appear in cases dealing with woman suffrage.
See, e.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
does not guarantee the right of suffrage as one of the “privileges and immunities” of a citizen).
275. WIS. CONVENTION OF 1846, supra note 59, at 278.
276. WIS. CONST. OF 1846, art. 8, sec. 1. This section also extended the franchise to “all
civilized persons of the Indian blood, not members of any tribe of Indians.” Wisconsin delegates
refused to decide the question of Black suffrage in the convention, instead sponsoring a popular
referendum on the issue. The extension of suffrage to Blacks failed by a vote of 15, 415 to 7,664.
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92–93.
48 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 19:1
accustomed to provide for themselves.”278 A similar line of reasoning was
put forward regarding Indian suffrage. As historian David Alan Johnson
summarizes, in the view of some California delegates, “ ‘Wild Indians and
Africans were, by reason of race, dependent beings and, as such, open to
manipulation by designing (White) men who by controlling their liveli-
hood controlled their votes.”279 Under this racial logic, those who were
territorial outsiders—who still owed allegiance to a different country or
sovereign—could have a greater claim to the right to vote than those who
were born and raised on American soil. There was to be no “Americaniza-
tion” through property ownership for these citizens, such as that delegates
envisioned for the European serf.
C. Residence and Fear of Corporate Influence
Race was a key factor in the debates over the adoption of property
rights for foreigners, but it was not the only category of exclusion. The
four early-adopter states each extended property rights to noncitizens, but
each extension included a key limitation: property rights were granted to
resident aliens only. Three of the early adopters—Iowa, California, and
Michigan—limited property rights to aliens who were state residents, spe-
cifically. There was little discussion of the inclusion of the word “resident,”
but the discussion that did take place indicates a concern for the actions of
foreign land speculators and wealthy aristocrats, who would purchase land
from afar without necessarily making an effort to improve or settle it. As
one Wisconsin delegate remarked, “What guarantee have we, that the
grandees of Europe would not come in and monopolize our very best
lands. That they would not actually crowd our own hard-working and
industrious citizens from the market.” He argued that given this possibility
of foreign monopoly, the state “had the right to require the residence and
service of the owners of our soil, as a return to the protection extended to
their property.”280
Animosity towards corporations, both foreign and native, was wide-
spread during this period.281 An Iowa delegate proposed a separate section
in the Bill of Rights that would have prohibited foreign corporations from
holding land within the state without the express permission of the legisla-
ture.282 This failed to pass, but such sentiments reappeared a few decades
278. MADISON, supra note 152, at 138.
279. JOHNSON, supra note 166, at 126.
280. WIS. CONVENTION OF 1847, supra note 31, at 93.
281. On the Grange movement, see generally D. SVEN NORDIN, RICH HARVEST: A HIS-
TORY OF THE GRANGE, 1867–1900 (1974). On the expression of corporate animosity in state
constitutions, see, e.g., G. Alan Tarr, State Constitutional Politics: An Historical Perspective, in CON-
STITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE STATES 3, 15 (G. Alan Tarr ed., 1996) (describing state constitu-
tional efforts to limit corporate power in the late-nineteenth century).
282. FRAGMENTS OF THE IOWA CONVENTIONS, supra note 152, at 159.
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later, when the Grange and other agrarian movements directly targeted
foreign corporate landholding.283
At least one delegate spoke in favor of extending rights to all foreign
purchasers, whether residents or not, on the basis of fairness and efficiency
in the distribution of property. Whether buying from afar, through a land
agent, or within the state, the title obtained at the land office “was as good
a one as any native born citizen could get, and the state had no right to
interfere with such a bona fide purchaser.” To restrict property rights to
resident aliens only, this delegate argued, would not be “dealing in good
faith” with foreign purchasers. These arguments failed to carry the day; a
motion by another delegate to strike the word “resident” from the provi-
sion was voted down.284
The debates and the surrounding political context reveal clearly the
impetus for limiting property rights to resident aliens: fear of foreign influ-
ence, particularly foreign corporate influence. The residence requirement
had a particular purpose: to ensure that noncitizen property rights fur-
thered the economic welfare of the state. Property rights were granted to
noncitizens as part of a scheme of Americanization of foreigners. This
scheme would be undermined if those who were not planning to establish
themselves in the state were allowed to purchase and sell land. By retaining
the connection between residence and property rights, these states kept the
door open for a continuing controversy over foreign ownership rights, one
that would play out in new ways in the twentieth century.
IV. THE PERSISTENCE OF A DIFFERENCE
The antebellum constitutional provisions in Iowa, Wisconsin, Cali-
fornia, and Michigan influenced other states after the Civil War. Between
1868 and 1890, seven states added clauses guaranteeing resident alien prop-
erty rights to their constitutions.285 It appeared to be the start of a long-
term trend; the delegates in Iowa and the states that followed likely
thought they were engaging in a long-overdue modernization of property
law, one of many to take place in the nineteenth century.286
Yet instead of widespread constitutionalization of alien property
rights, the trend essentially ended and in some cases reversed in the twenti-
eth century—even in those states that already had expanded property
rights on the books. Only one state, New Mexico, adopted a new consti-
tutional provision guaranteeing alien property rights in the twentieth cen-
283. See, e.g., Roger V. Clements, British-Controlled Enterprise in the West between 1870 and
1900, and Some Agrarian Reactions, 27 AGRICULTURAL HIST. 132, 139–41 (1953).
284. WIS. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 152, at 127.
285. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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tury, and it passed an amendment limiting such rights a decade later.287 Of
the thirteen states that adopted constitutional provisions extending prop-
erty rights to noncitizens in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, six
later repealed them or passed directly conflicting statutes. Four states—
Washington, South Carolina, Oklahoma, and Florida—created constitu-
tional provisions barring property ownership by resident and non-resident
foreigners or by those ineligible for naturalization.288 The common law
restrictions persisted in many states.289 Today, the majority of states—
thirty-six to be exact—have some form of alien property restriction on the
books.290 The variability is striking, but the overall landscape is one of
continuing (if under-enforced) restriction, rather than an expansion of
property rights.
Why did restrictive property provisions persist, rather than die out all
together like primogeniture, coverture, and the fee tail? The answer lies, in
part, in the constitutional provisions themselves.291 They were adopted
with certain assumptions in mind: that the beneficiaries were of a certain
origin (European), a certain race (White), and a certain location (within
287. N.M. CONST. OF 1910 art. II, § 22. The original section stated: “[N]o distinction
shall ever be made by law between resident aliens and citizens, in regard to the ownership or
descent of property.” Id. This section was amended in a special election on September 20, 1921.
The 1921 amendment stated:
Until otherwise provided by law no alien, ineligible to citizenship under the laws
of the United States, or corporation, copartnership or association, a majority of
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the territory). A restriction based on residence was explicitly included in
the provisions and the racialized nature of the rights granted was apparent
within the context of their passage. Yet each of these assumptions about
the identity of the property holder was challenged by new waves of mi-
grants from diverse parts of the world and by technological advances that
enabled land ownership from afar.
In the latter half of the nineteenth century and throughout the twen-
tieth, alien property disabilities proved resilient. Such restrictions served
new social functions, including protecting small domestic farmers against
foreign corporate takeover.292 In Iowa, for example, legislators proposed
and passed an amendment in 1886 that prohibited non-resident aliens from
holding property. The law was intended to prevent the scourge of “alien
landlordism,” which, according to an article in the Chicago Tribune, “has
proved a drain on the country and retarded its progress”; the article further
describes alien landlordism as “a political danger as well as an economic
evil.”293 Given the Iowa constitution’s limitation of property rights to resi-
dent aliens, this statute would seem to be redundant. It was clearly a politi-
cal move, a way to broadcast anti-foreign and anti-corporate sentiment.
Federal land law changed, as well. In 1887, due to anti-corporate
pressure, Congress passed a law prohibiting the purchase of land by aliens
who had not declared their intent to naturalize.294 The declarant provision
had been a part of preemption acts since the Homestead Act of 1862, but,
as we have seen, it had never applied to lands obtained through direct
purchase from the federal government. It was no coincidence that this law
was passed just a few years after Congress declared all Chinese immigrants
ineligible for naturalization.295 The new federal land law effectively barred
Chinese immigrants from purchasing federal public land, since they were
no longer eligible to naturalize.
In the early twentieth century, alien land laws continued as a legal
mode of race discrimination and took various anti-Asian forms. The ex-
pansive property rights granted by California’s 1850 constitution were di-
rectly contradicted by statutes passed in the early twentieth century barring
aliens “ineligible for naturalization” from owning or leasing property.296
During the Cold War, alien land laws became a political tool, used to
punish those with connections to communist countries. States adopted
“Iron Curtain Statutes” that barred persons from these countries from in-
heriting property in the United States.297 In recent years, alien property
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restrictions have emerged in ordinances prohibiting undocumented immi-
grants from renting—or, in some cases, occupying—housing.298
As this discussion reveals, the “unheard of liberality” of the federal
land laws only went so far.299 Federal territorial policy contributed to a
more expansive view of alien rights in states that were governed by territo-
rial law in the nineteenth century. The state constitutional provisions dis-
cussed here are a prime example of this legacy. But these state
constitutional provisions were, it turns out, not the beginning of a uniform
trend. These antebellum state constitutional provisions may have been
rooted in a vision of liberative property rights, but their limitations enabled
backtracking and recalcitrance.
CONCLUSION
Important works in immigration law and history have examined the
ways state governments restricted immigration prior to the federal govern-
ment’s restriction of immigration in the 1880s.300 Far less attention has
been paid to the ways states encouraged, aided, and abetted immigration
during the nineteenth century.301 This article has demonstrated that prop-
erty law was a key mechanism for regulating immigration at both the fed-
eral and state levels. It has also revealed one central precondition to pro-
immigrant state constitutional reform: the establishment of alien voting
and property rights in these states under federal territorial law. Congress
constrained itself when crafting the first naturalization law in 1790, refus-
ing to extend rights to noncitizens. Yet, by granting aliens rights in the
territories, the federal government established a precedent, and a distinct
legal culture, that helped make the constitutionalization of alien rights pos-
sible. Immigrants themselves were a critical part of the process of property
reform: they participated alongside citizens in creating state constitutions.
The end result of these efforts was an expansion of the fundamental rights
of certain noncitizens in these states. These expanded rights, while signifi-
cant in overturning the common law prohibition on alien property owner-
ship, contained exclusionary elements that would reappear in new guises
in the decades to follow.
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